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INTRODUCTION
Recent attempts to curb abortion rights through enactment of
new, restrictive regulations have sparked fresh debate, and the need
to learn from history, rather than be “condemned to repeat it.”1 Forty-
three new abortion restrictions were passed by nineteen states in
2012.2 The previous year, a staggering ninety-two restrictions were
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1. GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON, OR, THE PHASES OF HUMAN PROGRESS
284 (1905) (noting that “[t]hose who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat
it”).
2. Laws Affecting Reproductive Health and Rights: 2012 State Policy Review,
GUTTMACHER INST., http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/updates/2012/statetrends42012
.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2013).
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passed, the largest number ever reported.3 Simultaneously, no new
laws were passed in 2012 to improve access to abortion, family plan-
ning services, or comprehensive sex education.4
State restrictions can be broken down into four general areas:
(1) mandating unnecessary medical procedures, such as ultrasounds;
(2) increased level of scrutiny on abortion providers (e.g., requiring
abortion providers to have facilities with technology as advanced as
hospitals); (3) requirements for abortion providers to have admitting
privileges at hospitals; and (4) time limits, such as the Arizona and
Louisiana bans on abortions performed after twenty weeks.5
Abortion is an issue so charged with emotion that it is probably
the most misrepresented subject in the history of Anglo-American
law. That the misrepresentors have been legal scholars of the
reputation . . . of a Bracton or a Coke, is indeed cause for aston-
ishment, but our surprise must not blind us to the facts.6
Had twentieth century doctors known the history of abortion—
that the real reason for the nineteenth century abortion ban was the
danger of infection and death due to the lack of antiseptic procedures
and the need to protect the patient—“there would have been no need
for Roe v. Wade.” 7 So testified Professor Cyril W. Means, Jr., before
Congress in opposition to a proposed constitutional amendment to
outlaw abortion.8
A reexamination of the history of abortion law in the United
States is essential to an understanding of recent changes. Part I of
this Article will provide a synopsis of the early Anglo-American view
of abortion at common law, the early anti-abortion statutes, and the
state of abortion during the early twentieth century. Part II will dis-
cuss the liberalization of abortion laws, as well as the ways in which
the law pertaining to a woman’s right to choose has evolved since
1973. Finally, Part III will analyze the constitutionality of the cur-
rent wave of restrictions.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Jeffrey Toobin, The Abortion Issue Returns, DAILY COMMENT (May 28, 2013), http://
www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2013/05/abortion-returns-to-the-supreme
-court.html.
6. Hearings on Proposed Constitutional Amendments on Abortion Before the Sub-
committee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. Committee on the Judiciary, 94th
Cong. 2, 35–36 (1976) (statement of Professor Cyril W. Means, Jr.) [hereinafter Hearings].
7. Id. at 32.
8. Id.
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I. COMMON LAW, THE EARLY STATUTES, AND THE EMBERS OF REFORM
During the late seventeenth, the whole of the eigh-
teenth, and early nineteenth centuries, English and
American women were totally free from all re-
straints, ecclesiastical as well as secular, in regard
to the termination of unwanted pregnancies . . .
—Cyril C. Means, Jr.9
In 1973, Justice Harry Blackmun wrote in Roe v. Wade:10
[i]t is undisputed that at common law, abortion performed before
“quickening”—the first recognizable movement of the fetus in
utero, appearing from the 16th to the 18th week of pregnancy—
was not an indictable offense.11
Furthermore, Justice Blackmun referred to a “recent review” that
argued that even post-quickening abortion was never established as
a criminal offense under the common law.12 The review referred to
was written by Professor Cyril Means, Jr., a Professor of Law at New
York Law School.13
9. Cyril C. Means, The Phoenix of Abortional Freedom: Is a Penumbral or Ninth-
Amendment Right About to Arise from the Nineteenth-Century Legislative Ashes of a
Fourteenth-Century Common Law Liberty?, 17 N.Y.L.F. 335, 373 (1971) [hereinafter
Means 2]. Professor Means previously wrote The Law of New York Concerning Abortion
and the Status of the Foetus, 1664–1968: A Case of Cessation of Constitutionality, 14
N.Y.L.F. 411 (1968) [hereinafter Means 1].
10. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 132 (1973).
11. Id. at 132. For a further discussion of Roe v. Wade, see infra Part II.
12. Id. at 135.
13. See JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, DISPELLING THE MYTHS OF ABORTION HISTORY 13
(2006). Although Dellapenna’s book criticizes Professor Means’ analysis and those other
scholars who have confirmed his work, the book is deeply flawed. Id. at 684. It contains
numerous typographical errors such as the second “waive” of feminism and “phased” for
“fazed,” Id. at 99, 641, 644, 684, 764, 848, and is filled with self contradictions. For ex-
ample, the account of Roe v. Wade indicates that attorney Sarah Weddington did not use
plaintiff’s claim that her pregnancy resulted from rape (a story that the plaintiff recanted
years later). Id. at 680. Yet, elsewhere in the same account, the author says that “this
lie, repeated frequently in open court, was carried up without question and appears in the
Supreme Court opinion as well.” Id. at 678–83, n.392. But the page cited in the Roe opinion
does not support a claim of rape. Roe, 410 U.S. at 143. It merely refers to a policy on rape
and abortion proposed by a committee of the American Medical Association. Roe, 410 U.S.
at 142, 113, 120, 124–25. The Roe opinion’s description of “Jane Roe” says nothing about
a rape claim. Id. at 120.
An extremely serious misstatement is contained at page 592 of the book, where Della-
penna says that a group of people who had handicaps as children “unanimously agree
that they should have been allowed to die.” DELLAPENNA, at 592. The essay by C. Everett
Koop, which Dellapenna cites, actually reads “not have been allowed to die.” C. Everett
Koop, Ethical and Surgical Considerations in the Care of the Newborn with Congenital
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Up until 1968, scholars had neglected to produce or analyze the
history of abortion in Anglo-American law.14 Professor Means was
a member of the Governor’s Commission Appointed to Review New
York State’s Abortion Law15 and his exhaustive research was incor-
porated into that Report, which was the first history of abortion.16
The Report noted that abortion was not illegal in either England or
America before the nineteenth century,17 and that even when abor-
tion was banned in the 1800s, the purpose was solely to protect the
life of the mother.18 Professor Means’ history, described as the “new
orthodoxy,”19 is now accepted by the vast majority of legal scholars.20
Abnormalities, in INFANTICIDE AND THE HANDICAPPED NEWBORN 94–95 (Dennis J. Horan
and Melinda Delahoyde eds., 1982).
The book also claims that the Supreme Court had actually sustained abortion statutes
in several earlier cases. Id. at 689 n.445 (citing Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 25 (1949);
Missouri ex rel. Hurwitz v. North, 271 U.S. 40, 41 (1926); United States v. Holte, 236 U.S.
140, 145 (1915); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 190 (1898); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S.
727 (1877)). Dellapenna credits another author for this information, Frank Scaturro, and
chides the Court for not mentioning them. See DELLAPENNA, at 689 n.445 (citing Frank
Scaturro, Abortion and the Supreme Court: Roe, Casey, and the Myth of Stare Decisis,
3 HOLY CROSS J. OF L. & PUB. POL’Y 133 (1998)). Although the cases did concern abortion
prosecutions, the constitutionality of such a prosecution was never raised. See Hawker,
170 U.S. at 190; see also Holte, 236 U.S. at 145. As a first year law student learns, “the
most that can be said is that the point was in the case if anyone had seen fit to raise it.
Questions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the court
nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute pre-
cedents.” Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925); see also United States v. L.A. Tucker
Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 38 (1952) (Jackson, J.) (an issue not “raised in briefs or argu-
ment nor discussed in the opinion of the Court” cannot be taken as “a binding precedent
on this point”). To the extent that Dellapenna contends that the earlier cases must have
“assumed” constitutionality, even if he correctly characterized this “assumption,” it is suf-
ficient to note that the “[Supreme] Court is not bound by its prior assumptions.” Lopez v.
Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 266, 281 (1999).
14. See, e.g., 3 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND
54 (1883) (concluding merely that abortion was a crime exclusively under the jurisdiction
of the ecclesiastical courts); 11 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 537 (23 vol.,
7th ed. 1956) (barely mentioning abortion in his multivolume history).
15. See CHARLES W. FROESSEL ET AL., REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR’S COMM’N APPOINTED
TO REVIEW NEW YORK STATE’S ABORTION LAWS (1968) (proposing revisions to New York’s
abortion laws) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR’S COMM’N]. The Commission was
chaired by the Honorable Charles W. Froessel, a former Judge of the New York Court of
Appeals, that State’s Court of last resort. Id.
16. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 13, at 13.
17. See Means 2, supra note 9, at 336, 351–54, 374–75, 409–10, n.175.
18. See id. at 382–92; see also Means 1, supra note 9, at 511–15.
19. DELLAPENNA, supra note 13, at 13.
20. See, e.g., DAVID GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY AND THE
MAKING OF ROE V. WADE 271–72 (2d ed. 1998); JAMES MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE
ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF A NATIONAL POLICY, 1800–1900, at 265 (1978); LESLIE REAGAN,
WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME: WOMEN, MEDICINE, AND THE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES,
1867–1973, at 8–14 (1997); Ronald Dworkin, The Great Abortion Case, N.Y. REV. BOOKS 49–
50, n. 10 (1989); Cass Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (with Special Reference
to Pornography, Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 36–37, n.134 (1992).
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A. Legal Abortions (c. 1250–1803)
The practice of abortion was common throughout history.21
Records show that the Romans relied on the juice of the now extinct
silphium plant to induce abortions, while the Greeks employed the
herb pennyroyal for the same purpose.22 However, the starting point
for the present discussion must be the common law decisions that
preceded the first state anti-abortion laws passed in America.23
In England between 1327 and 1803, and in the United States be-
tween 1607 and 1830, the common law afforded women the right to
have an abortion.24 The bases for this law were primarily two anon-
ymous cases: (1) “The Twinslayer’s Case,” also known as Rex v. de
Bourton, involved a defendant who had beaten a woman in an ad-
vanced stage of pregnancy, terminating her pregnancy with twins.25
The justices were not willing to consider the matter as a felony.26
(2) “The Abortionist’s Case,” Rex v. Anonymous, involved a defendant
who was indicted for killing a child in a mother’s womb, but was not
convicted because of the difficulty in proving his responsibility for
the death.27
The writings of Henry de Bracton, an English jurist in the mid-
thirteenth century, indicate that these cases involved problems of
procedural proof rather than the legality of abortion.28 Bracton wrote
that if someone “[hit] a pregnant woman or g[ave] her poison in order
to procure an abortion, if the foetus [was] already formed or quickened,
especially if it [was] quickened, he commit[ted] homicide.” 29
It must be emphasized that Bracton used the word “quickened.”30
The reasoning behind this phrase was that the central issue, even at
common law, was at what point a fetus became a person.31 Professor
21. See N.E.H. HULL & PETER C. HOFFER, ROE V. WADE: THE ABORTION RIGHTS
CONTROVERSY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 12 (2001).
22. See id. at 12–13.
23. See infra Part I.B. For a thorough discussion of Roman, Greek, and other early
cultural views on abortion, see Special Project: Survey of Abortion Law, 1980 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 67, 73–83 (1980) [hereinafter Survey].
24. See Means 2, supra note 9, at 336–37.
25. Id. at 337 (translating Rex v. Anonymous, Y.B. 1 Edw. 3, fol. 23, pl. 18 (1327)
(Eng.)). This case comes from a “Yearbook,” which reports the legal discussions in the royal
courts of England. See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 204–06
(3d ed. 1990).
26. Means 2, supra note 9, at 337.
27. Id. at 339 (translating Rex v. Anonymous, Y.B. 22 Edw. 3 (K.B. 1348)).
28. 2 HENRY DE BRACTON, THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 341 (in Latin, c. 1250)
(Samuel E. Thorne ed., 1968).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Means 1, supra note 9, at 420.
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Means cited the writings of Sir William Staunford (1509–1558), a
judge of the Court of Common Pleas, and William Lambarde (1536–
1601), a legal critic, who both claimed that an unborn child was not a
person in rerum natura and consequently its death was not murder.32
The term “animated” was interpreted to have both “physical
and philosophical underpinnings.” 33 While doctors during the Middle
Ages had no dependable methods of determining when a woman was
pregnant,34 both theologians and philosophers alike argued that a
fetus was not a human being until “ensoulment, or animation, the
point between conception and birth at which the fetus acquires a
rational soul.” 35
Furthermore, at the time Bracton wrote his commentary, abortion
cases were primarily within the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts36
rather than the secular courts. Consequently, there would have been
very meager secular case law on the subject, and other sources had to
be examined to determine the common law.37 One English historian
believed that Bracton’s discussion of abortion was actually developed
from a twelfth century handbook on Canon law.38
By the seventeenth century, cases dealing with abortion fell
within the jurisdiction of the Crown.39 At this point, commentators
began to place a greater emphasis on whether a woman was “quick
with child,” 40 rather than pregnant, in discussions on abortions.
The doctrine of quickening was originally developed by St.
Thomas Aquinas in the twelfth century.41 Aquinas taught that the
fetus did not have a soul until the point of quickening,42 that fetal
32. See id. (citing WILLIAM STAUNFORD, LES PLEAS DEL CORON ch. 13 (1557); WILLIAM
LAMBARDE, OF THE OFFICE OF THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 217–18 (1581)).
33. Amy Johnson, Abortion, Personhood, and Privacy in Texas, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1521,
1522 (1990).
34. See MOHR, supra note 20, at 4.
35. Johnson, supra note 33, at 1522 (citing Catechism of the Council of Trent (1545–
1563), Creed, pt. I, art. III, no. 4 (“Whereas no human body, when the order of nature is fol-
lowed can be informed by the soul of man except after the prescribed interval of time.”));
H. de Dorlodot, A Vindication of the Mediate Animation Theory, in A SHORT HISTORY OF
EMBRYOLOGY 272, 275, 278 (E. Messenger ed., 1949).
36. The ecclesiastical courts were established after the Norman Conquest and dealt
with religious matters and moral crimes such as abortion. See Survey, supra note 23, at 86.
37. See id.
38. See Maitland, Selected Passages from Braction and Azo, in 8 SHELDON SOCIETY
225 (1894). Professor Dellapenna concedes that Bracton used canon law to “fill in the gaps”
in the common law.
39. See JOHN KEOWN, ABORTION, DOCTORS AND THE LAW 6 (1988).
40. “Quickening” refers to the first time a pregnant woman feels fetal movements,
which occurs between sixteen and twenty weeks. See STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY
FOR THE HEALTH PROFESSIONS AND NURSING 1243 (5th ed. 2005).
41. See Survey, supra note 23, at 87–88.
42. A. PEGIS, 1 BASIC WRITINGS OF SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS Q. 709 (1945).
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movement should be used to differentiate between pregnancy stages,43
and that abortion prior to this point was not the same as killing a
person.44 Once abortion fell within the jurisdiction of the common law
courts, the quickening doctrine was adopted as the legal standard for
differentiating between legal and illegal abortions.45
Evidence to support the use of this standard is found in the com-
mentaries written by Sir Edward Coke in which he observes that
abortions that took place after the “quickening” of a fetus was a fel-
ony, but not murder.46 Sir Matthew Hale’s Summary of the Pleas of
the Crown echoes these sentiments: “[Abortion] must be a person in
rerum natura. If a woman quick with Child take a potion to kill it, and
accordingly it is destroyed without being born alive, a great mispri-
sion, but no Felony; but if born alive, and after dies of that potion, it
is Murder.” 47
The difference between Bracton’s and Justice Coke’s accounts
of abortion law is due to the evolution of English law between 1200
and 1600.48 Bracton’s use of the terms “formed” or “animated” was
derived from church law, not the common law of the secular courts.49
In contrast, Coke’s quickening doctrine gained widespread acceptance
centuries after Bracton had written his work when abortion cases
were being heard by secular courts.50 Thus, while the Church may
have treated abortion before fetal movement as a crime, the common
law did not.
Another factor supporting a common law distinction between
“pregnant” and “quick with child” comes from the procedural rule of
reprieve.51 As Sir William Blackstone wrote:
But if she once hath had the benefit of this reprieve, and been de-
livered, and afterward becomes pregnant again, she shall not be
entitled to the benefit of a farther respite for that cause. For she
may now be executed before the child is quick in the womb; and
shall not, by her own incontinence, evade the sentence of justice.52
43. Id. at 706.
44. See J. NOONAN, THE MORALITY OF ABORTION—LEGAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPEC-
TIVES 23 (1970).
45. See Survey, supra note 23, at 88.
46. See EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
50–51 (Garland Publ’g 1979) (1644).
47. SIR MATTHEW HALE, PLEASE OF THE CROWN: OR A METHODOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF
THE PRINCIPLE MATTERS RELATING TO THAT SUBJECT 53 (1682).
48. See Survey, supra note 23, at 89.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See Means 2, supra note 9, at 421.
52. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *394–95 (1769).
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Justice Blackstone also supported Justice Coke’s born-alive rule,53
believing that the act of abortion while “quick with child” was merely
a misdemeanor.54
Professor Means stated that “at common law, abortion, even
after quickening, was not even a misprision,” 55 although there is some
evidence that an abortion performed after quickening could be prose-
cuted as a misdemeanor,56 as Coke contended.57 Be that as it may,
abortions before quickening certainly were not chargeable offenses
under English Common law.58
There was an obvious distinction made involving the period in
a pregnancy between twenty and twenty-four weeks, i.e., from the
moment the woman can feel the fetus, until viability.59 This distinc-
tion is analogous to the modern constitutional thinking concerning
state regulation and involvement at later stages of pregnancy.60 While
it is evident that at common law an abortion during this period could
be considered a crime,61 this can be explained by the lack of medical
knowledge regarding the point at which a child is able to survive on
its own outside the womb.62 The important point to take away from
this portion of history, is that up until the enactment of anti-abortion
laws in the nineteenth century abortion was, in fact, legal under the
common law, as Professor Means documented.63
B. Abortion Becomes a Crime: The Birth of Anti-Abortion
Legislation (1803–1900)
In 1803, abortion became a felony offense in England.64 The
statute65 was developed by the Chancellor of England, Lord Ellenbor-
ough, a moralist and traditionalist.66 No adequate explanation has
53. See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text.
54. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 13, at 239; see also WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE
ON THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 80 (Richard & Lintot, eds, 4th Ed. 1762) (“But at this Day,
it is said to be a great Misprision [misdemeanor] only, and not Murder, unless the Child be
born alive . . . ”).
55. See Means 1, supra note 9, at 353.
56. See Regina v. Webb (Q.B. 1602), CALENDAR OF ASSIZE REC., SURREY INDICTMENTS,
ELIZ. I, at 512 (no. 3146) (J. Cockburn ed., 1980); see also Regina v. Sims, 75 ENG. REP. 1075
(Q.B. 1601).
57. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
58. See Means 2, supra note 9, at 353.
59. See HALE, supra note 47, at 53.
60. For a more thorough discussion of fetus viability, see infra Parts II & III.
61. See Survey, supra note 23, at 88.
62. See supra notes 39–45 and accompanying text.
63. See Means 1, supra note 9, at 420.
64. See Survey, supra note 23, at 91.
65. 43 Geo. III c. 58.
66. See HULL & HOFFER, supra note 21, at 19. For a short biography of Lord Ellen-
borough, see DELLAPENNA, supra note 13, at 246.
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been given for Lord Ellenborough’s Act,67 but it is clear that this law
criminalized abortions at all stages of pregnancy.68 Incredibly, the
Act made successful abortions prior to quickening a crime punish-
able only by a fine, while the mere attempt to perform an abortion
after quickening could yield a death sentence.69 The inconsistencies
in Lord Ellenborough’s Act were “rectified” in 1828, when all surgical
abortions were made illegal, and the punishment for pre-quickening
abortions reduced.70
The English abortion law was not immediately adopted in the
United States.71 In fact, prior to 1821 prosecutions for abortion in the
United States were “virtually nonexistent.” 72 There is evidence that
abortion after quickening had indeed been a crime in the colonies prior
to the Revolution.73 However, after the United States gained its inde-
pendence, there is no evidence to suggest abortion was treated as a
crime during the first few decades of the new nation. Instead, reform
movements in America sought to adopt laws that lacked the “brutality
of the English criminal code.” 74 Thus, when the first reported abor-
tion cases took place in Massachusetts in 1812, the Supreme Judicial
Court dismissed the charges when the prosecution failed to prove that
the woman had quickened.75
In 1821, Connecticut became the first state to ban post-quicken-
ing abortions.76 The primary purpose of the law was to prosecute abor-
tionists, rather than women.77 In practice, charges were only brought
when a woman died or was grievously injured.78 In the following de-
cade, Missouri, Illinois, and New York legislators adopted laws with
a wording similar to the Connecticut statute;79 however, the statutes
in Missouri and Illinois notably excluded the quickening doctrine.80
67. KEOWN, supra note 39, at 12; see also DELLAPENNA, supra note 13, at 246 (conced-
ing that there was “no reported public outcry against abortion” to explain the act). But see
DELLAPENNA, supra note 13, at 256–57 (arguing that protection of the fetus was part of the
purpose of the act).
68. See KEOWN, supra note 39, at 25 (emphasis added).
69. See Survey, supra note 23, at 92 (arguing that this inconsistency resulted from the
legislation being poorly drafted).
70. Lord Lansdowne’s Act, 1828, 9 Geo. IV, c. 31 (1828).
71. See HULL & HOFFER, supra note 21, at 19; see also Survey, supra note 23, at 93.
72. See Survey, supra note 23, at 93.
73. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 13, at 211–28 (claiming that “no one has advanced
any reason to suppose that public attitudes towards abortions changed during . . . the early
years of the Republic” despite any supporting case law).
74. HULL & HOFFER, supra note 21, at 19.
75. Commonwealth v. Bangs, 9 Mass. 387, 388 (1812).
76. See MOHR, supra note 20, at 20–21 n.8 (citing 1821 Conn. Pub. Acts tit. 22 §§ 14, 16,
at 152–53).
77. See MOHR, supra note 20, at 20–21.
78. See HULL & HOFFER, supra note 21, at 20.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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Nevertheless, prior to 1840, all but eight of the states retained the
common-law right to pre-quickening abortions.81
It remains somewhat of a mystery as to why some states, in-
cluding New York, legislatively advanced the quickening doctrine by
treating abortion before quickening as a misdemeanor.82 Although it
has been argued that the phrase “quick with child” was synonymous
with all stages of pregnancy, even in 1829,83 the argument is dispelled
by the very language of the New York statute, which explicitly dis-
tinguished between “any woman pregnant with a quick child” and
simply a “pregnant woman.” 84 The best explanation is that the few
prosecutions that took place suggest that the change was not intended
to treat the embryo as a victim of a crime.85 Other facts also support
the proposition that the earliest American abortion laws were de-
signed to protect the woman rather than the fetus.86 For example, it
is indicative that in the two decades after Connecticut passed its law,
no state abortion law punished the pregnant woman.87 In fact, a New
Jersey case in 1858 explicitly states that the legislature’s intent was
not to prevent abortions, but rather to guard the “health and life of the
mother.” 88 Professor Means attributed this reasoning to the passage
of the New York statutes in 1828.89 Thus, until the 1840s state abor-
tion laws were passed because of a greater recognition that abortion
procedures were unsafe and a threat to the life of the mother.90
There were, however, several cases in the nineteenth century
in which a court rejected the protection of fetal life as a purpose for
banning abortion.91 This shift necessitates an inquiry into the cause
of the mid-nineteenth century spread of anti-abortion legislation de-
signed to protect the unborn.92 Attitudes towards abortion in America
began to change around the 1840s due to three factors: “(1) the per-
ceived frequency of abortions by white, middle-class, Protestant,
81. Id. at 20–21.
82. See N.Y. REV. STAT. pt. IV, ch. 1, tit. 2, §§ 8, 9, at 550, pt. IV, ch. 1, tit. 6, § 21, at
578 (1829).
83. DELLAPENNA, supra note 13, at 278.
84. See N.Y. REV. STAT. pt. IV, ch. 1, tit. 2, art. 1, §§ 9, 21 (1829).
85. See HULL & HOFFER, supra note 21, at 20.
86. Id.
87. See MOHR, supra note 20, at 43.
88. State v. Murphy, 27 N.J.L. 112, 114 (1858) (construing Act of March 1, 1848, 1849
N.J. Laws 266).
89. Means 2, supra note 9, at 391 (“The protection of the life of the pregnant woman
is therefore the only reason ever advanced for the passage of the New York statutes in
1828 . . . ”).
90. Id. at 391.
91. See, e.g., Dougherty v. People, 1 Colo. 514, 522 (1872); Murphy, 27 N.J.L. at 114.
92. See Means 2, supra note 9, at 382.
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married women, (2) the dangers of abortion, and (3) the activism of
physicians in opposition to abortion.” 93
Regarding the first factor, evidence shows that Americans origi-
nally believed abortion to be a problem particular to the lower classes
of society.94 As James Mohr, Professor of History at the University of
Oregon, indicates: “[b]efore 1840 abortion was perceived in the United
States primarily as a recourse of the desperate, especially of the young
woman in trouble who feared the wrath of an over-exacting society.” 95
In 1798, Thomas Malthus had published his Essay on the Principle of
Population, in which he predicted that populations would eventually
grow out of control, and suggested voluntary abstinence from sex as a
solution.96 This was a “sobering warning to an English nation already
concerned with agricultural rioting and urban unrest by large num-
bers of poor people.” 97 Considering that most abortions Americans
had heard of involved the poor, it is not surprising that abortion was
often “overlooked.” 98
The process of commercialization brought abortion to the fore-
front of public attention in the early 1840s.99 Members of the medical
community competed fiercely for clients in the new abortion indus-
try.100 As a result, advertisements quickly became common practice,101
appearing in urban and rural newspapers, popular magazines and
journals.102 In addition, some abortionists even gained fame and public
attention.103 For instance, Madame Restell of New York City was ar-
rested in 1841 for performing abortions on a large scale.104 She was con-
victed of only minor infractions, and then went on to open several East
Coast branches after the publicity provided a boost to her career.105
93. Johnson, supra note 33, at 1523.
94. Id. at 1527.
95. MOHR, supra note 20, at 86.
96. See THOMAS MALTHUS, ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION (Donald Winch
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1993).
97. HULL & HOFFER, supra note 21, at 22.
98. Id. at 23.
99. MOHR, supra note 20, at 47.
100. Id. For a more thorough analysis of competition within the medical field during this
time, see Barnes Riznik, The Professional Lives of Early Nineteenth-Century New England
Doctors, 19 J. HIST. MED. & ALLIED SCIS. 1, 1–16 (1964). See also Edward C. Atwater, The
Medical Profession in a New Society, Rochester, New York (1811–1860), 47 BULL. HIST.
MED. 3, 228 (1973).
101. See Atwater, supra note 100, at 228.
102. See MOHR, supra note 20, at 47.
103. Id. at 48.
104. Id.
105. See WILLIAM F. HOWE & A.H. HUMMEL, IN DANGER; OR LIFE IN NEW YORK, A TRUE
HISTORY OF A GREAT CITY’S WILES AND TEMPTATIONS. TRUE FACTS AND DISCLOSURES
155–67 (J.S. Ogilvie & Co. 1888); see also Editorial Dep’t, Madame Restelle, and Some
of Her Dupes, 1 N.Y. MED. & SURGICAL REP. 10, 158–65 (1846).
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Ms. Restelle was not an isolated case, but was the most famous of the
1840s abortionists.106
After 1840, abortions increased,107 and rates rose from one abor-
tion for every twenty-five to thirty live births at the turn of the century
to one for every five or six by the middle of the nineteenth century.108
One potential reason for this change was that married women began
to desire limiting their family size.109 A further piece of evidence for an
increase in abortions is an almost four percent decline in birth rates
from 1800 to 1900.110 However, it is worth noting that the increase in
abortion rates was not simply due to more abortions taking place, but
also due to the increased visibility of abortion.111 This had the impor-
tant effect of changing public perception towards the belief that abor-
tions were more common than earlier in American history.112 As a
result, physicians and politicians alike grew concerned that white mar-
ried women had begun using abortion as a method of birth control.113
In the mid-1800s, scholars writing on abortion were describing
the practice as common to “every village, hamlet, and neighborhood
in the United States.”114 As the idea that abortion was common took
hold, so did an awareness that existing abortion procedures were
dangerous.115 Abortions performed in New York as late as 1884, by
competent physicians during the early stages of pregnancy, were ten
to fifteen times more dangerous than childbirth.116 Thus, if protect-
ing the health of the mother was the only reason anti-abortion laws
were passed during the nineteenth century, then their reasoning
was justified.117
Nonetheless, arguments in opposition began to emerge within
a segment of the medical profession at the newly founded American
106. See MOHR, supra note 20, at 48.
107. See id. at 48–49.
108. See id. at 50.
109. See Survey, supra note 23, at 96–97; see also MOHR, supra note 20, at 90 (citing
REPORT TO THE NEW YORK MEDICO-LEGAL SOCIETY (June 4–7, 1889), reprinted as 7
MEDICO-LEGAL J. 183 (1889) (noting that seventy-five to ninety percent of abortions were
for Protestant married women)).
110. See N. COTT & E. PLECK, A HERITAGE OF HER OWN: TOWARD A NEW SOCIAL
HISTORY OF AMERICAN WOMEN 226 (1979) (noting that birth rates declined from 7.04
percent in 1800 to 3.56 percent by 1900).
111. See id. at 225.
112. See Johnson, supra note 33, at 1523.
113. See id. (citing MOHR, supra note 20, at 93–95).
114. See MOHR, supra note 20, at 100 (citing J. Miller, Criminal Abortion, 1 KAN. CITY
MED. RECORD, no. 8, 295 (1884)).
115. See Means 2, supra note 9, at 382.
116. Id. at 382–87. A thorough discussion of death rates from infection during the
nineteenth century is also included in this source.
117. See id. at 382.
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Medical Association (AMA).118 The campaign was led by Doctor Hora-
tio Robinson Storer, who introduced a resolution in Massachusetts
in 1857, recommending that the Suffolk County Medical Society con-
sider whether further anti-abortion legislation was necessary in the
Commonwealth.119 The AMA argued that the fetus was alive before
quickening and that it possesses “inherent rights, for civil purposes.”120
Several reasons have been put forth to explain the surge in physi-
cian opposition.121 The main one was the claim that physicians saw in
the abortion controversy an opportunity to force “irregulars from the
profession.”122 “The regulars felt that if they could prohibit abortion it
would eliminate most of the irregulars’ practice and make it finan-
cially undesirable to continue.”123 Additionally, the majority of physi-
cians were white Anglo-Saxons who were prejudiced against Catholic
immigrants based on fears of developing a Catholic majority.124
On the religious front, both the Roman Catholic Church as well
as the Presbyterian Church began to oppose abortion with increasing
frequency.125 The strongest opposition came from the Puritans.126 Puri-
tan attacks were based on the notion that female morality could be up-
held by instilling fear of pregnancy in women.127 Anthony Comstock,
a politician dedicated to ideas of Victorian morality, used his connec-
tions to Congressional lobbyists to stifle the abortion advertisements
and products.128 After Comstock was appointed as a special agent for
the Post Office Department in 1873, he had almost “unlimited author-
ity over American vice” by having the power to open mail and judge
for himself what was obscene.129
Many early suffragettes had mixed views on the abortion issue.130
Elizabeth Cady Stanton saw the practice as part of the “degradation
of woman,” and thought that denying children to “those [husbands]
who have made the ‘strong minded’ women of this generation the tar-
get for gibes and jeers” was just.131 Nevertheless, most suffragettes of
118. See MOHR, supra note 20, at 147.
119. MOHR, supra note 20, at 152 (citing Criminal Abortion, 56 BOSTON MED. & SURGI-
CAL J. 14, 282–84 (1857)).
120. See Survey, supra note 23, at 98 (quoting 12 TRANSCRIPT OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION 73–78 (1859)).
121. See id. at 97.
122. Survey, supra note 23, at 99.
123. Id. (citing MOHR, supra note 20, at 37).
124. See MOHR, supra note 20, at 166–67.
125. See HULL & HOFFER, supra note 21, at 32.
126. See Survey, supra note 23, at 99.
127. See LAWRENCE LADER, ABORTION 90 (1966) [hereinafter LADER 1].
128. Id. at 100.
129. Id. at 91.
130. See MOHR, supra note 20, at 111.
131. See id. (quoting Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Infanticide and Prostitution, 1 REVOLU-
TION 65, 65 (1868)).
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the time thought that the solution to high rates of abortion was not le-
galization, but “ ‘the education and enfranchisement of women,’ ” which
they believed would render abortion unnecessary in the future.132
During the anti-abortion movement of the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury, more states introduced statutes that made abortion illegal at all
stages of pregnancy.133 In 1860, Pennsylvania made it a felony offense
to attempt the abortion of a fetus at any period during gestation.134 In
1872, New York amended its anti-abortion laws even further, banning
abortion advertisements, prohibiting advising women to have an abor-
tion, and making it a crime for a woman to agree to an abortion.135
These two laws are representative of the changes that were taking
place throughout the country.136
In the nineteenth century the erosion of the quickening doctrine
was replaced with the belief that a fetus is a living human person from
the moment of conception.137 This was the result of discoveries regard-
ing the process of fertilization, as well as new medical literature.138
Most notably, Dr. John Beck, Professor of Medical Jurisprudence at
the College of Physicians and Surgeons of the University of the State
of New York, wrote a treatise in which he supported anti-abortion
laws on the theory that the practice amounted to the killing of a
human being139 and that life began at conception.140 Views began to
shift away from the idea that abortion laws were designed to protect
the life of the mother,141 and cases reflected this shift. In Regina v.
Wycherley,142 the court interpreted “quick with child” to mean after
conception rather than after fetal movement.143
The idea that abortion was illegal at all stages of pregnancy
received a blow, however, in 1884 when Judge, later Justice, Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. introduced the concept of viability,144 which had
been initially discussed during the nineteenth century.145 An English
attorney, Joseph Chitty, even argued that deciding whether killing
132. See MOHR, supra note 20, at 112 (quoting Stanton, supra note 131, at 65).
133. See Survey, supra note 23, at 100.
134. 1860 PA. LAWS NO. 374 §§ 87–89 (1860).
135. N.Y. GEN. STATS. Ch. 181, §§ 1, 2, 3, 4, at 71 (1872).
136. See Survey, supra note 23, at 101.
137. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 13, at 256–61 nn.205–46, 281–84 nn.149–79.
138. See A HISTORY OF SCIENCE 461 (René Taton ed., 1965) (describing the process in
which Jean Louis Prevost and Jean-Baptiste André Dumas fertilized frog eggs in 1824).
139. JOHN BECK, AN INAUGURAL DISSERTATION ON INFANTICIDE 13 (1817).
140. See id. at 34.
141. See supra Part I.A.
142. 173 ENG. REP. 486 (N.P. 1838).
143. Id.
144. Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
145. See A.S. TAYLOR, A MANUAL OF MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 420 (7th Eng. Ed. 1866).
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an infant was homicide should depend on viability.146 But as Holmes
explained: “Lord Coke’s rule requires that the woman be quick with
child, which, as this court has decided, means more than pregnant,
and requires that the child shall have reached some degree of quasi-
independent life at the moment of the act . . . .”147
In England, viability was introduced as a legal concept through
the passage of the Infant Life (Preservation) Act, in which a presump-
tion of viability existed at twenty-eight weeks.148 In the United States,
however, the concept of viability remained limited to prenatal injury
cases and was not used in the context of abortion until Roe v. Wade
was decided.149
C. Abortion is Illegal (1900–1960)
By the early twentieth century, anti-abortion laws were firmly
entrenched, and the chances of securing their repeal seemed impos-
sible. By 1910, every state except for Kentucky150 had anti-abortion
laws on the books.151 Until 1967, forty-nine states and the District of
Columbia made abortion a felony offense.152 In the span of time be-
tween the first anti-abortion law in 1821153 and the turn of the twen-
tieth century, the quickening doctrine had all but been abandoned as
the distinction between legal and illegal abortions.154 Most states did,
146. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 13, at 463 (citing JOSEPH CHITTY, A PRACTICAL
TREATISE ON MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 415 (1st Am. Ed. 1835)).
147. See Means 1, supra note 9, at 423 (quoting Dietrich, 138 Mass. at 15).
148. See 19 & 20 Geo. V ch. 34 § 1(2). The presumption was changed to twenty-four
weeks in 1990.
149. See infra Part II.
150. Although Kentucky had no statutes making abortion illegal, the state courts had
declared the practice illegal in 1883. See Peoples v. Comm’r, 9 S.W. 509, 511 (1883).
151. See Survey, supra note 23, at 102.
152. Id. at n.174.
153. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
154. As noted in Survey, most states enacted two statutes, the first of which punished
the willful killing of an unborn quick child, while the second punished attempts to aid in
procuring an abortion at any point in the pregnancy. See Survey, supra note 23, at 102. An
example of these types of statutes is KAN. GEN. LAWS ch. 28, §§ 9, 10 (1859), reprinted
in Survey, supra note 23, at 102 n.176:
Section 9: The wilful killing, of any unborn quick child, by any injury to the
mother of such child, which would be murder if it resulted in the death of such
mother, shall be deemed manslaughter in the first degree.
Section 10: Every person who shall administer to any woman, pregnant with
a quick child, any medicine, drug or substance whatsoever, or shall use or
employ any instrument or other means, with intent thereby to destroy such
child, unless the same shall have been necessary to preserve the life of such
mother, or shall have been advised by a physician to be necessary for that
purpose, shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter in the second degree.
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however, include exceptions for “therapeutic” abortions.155 The most
common form of exception permitted abortions where those necessary
to save the mother’s life.156
In the first half of the twentieth century, abortion laws effectively
created a two-tiered system.157 Privileged women were able to pay doc-
tors for abortions, and persuade them to perform the procedure.158
The poor and destitute faced restrictive laws which forced them to
have an unwanted child or seek out illegal abortions,159 or travel to
foreign countries to seek abortion services.160 In the years preceding
the onset of the First World War, public discussion of sex was con-
sidered taboo.161
Additionally, before 1950, there was no unified movement to re-
peal abortion laws in the United States.162 Instead, birth control advo-
cates had focused on promoting the legalization and availability of
contraception.163 The greatest pioneers of the movement were Emma
Goldman and Margaret Sanger,164 whose efforts finally met success
when a constitutional right to privacy was recognized in 1965.165
During the 1930s and 1940s, police raids on abortion clinics
were sensationalized in the press.166 Raids in 1941, 1942, and 1947
in Chicago targeted both the abortionists, Dr. Josephine Gabler and
Mrs. Ada Martin, of the Gabler-Martin abortion clinic, as well as their
patients.167 In the Martin case, Chicago newspapers presented the
arrests as a crackdown that had brought down an organized crime
155. “Therapeutic” abortion “refers to those abortions done pursuant to statutory ex-
ceptions to the general prohibition of abortion. Therapeutic abortions may be called for
where there are dangers to the mother’s life or health, permanent serious fetal defects,
or pregnancies resulting from rape or incest.” Survey, supra note 23, at 103 n.177.
156. These statutes are printed in Survey, supra note 23, at 103 n.178.
157. See Brief for American Historians as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees, at 39,
Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-605).
158. See id. at 22.
159. See infra Part II.
160. See Survey, supra note 23, at 105.
161. Chelsea Mageland, What’s Going on in the Early 1900s?, HISTORY OF HUMAN SEXU-
ALITY IN WESTERN CULTURE, http://historyofsexuality.umwblogs.org/topic-1/early-1900s/.
162. See GERMAIN GRISEZ, ABORTION: THE MYTHS, THE REALITIES, AND THE ARGUMENTS
229, 230 (1970).
163. See id. at 229; see also HULL & HOFFER, supra note 21, at 54–65.
164. See HULL & HOFFER, supra note 21, at 54. It is worth noting that Sanger herself
was opposed to abortion, having watched in horror as large numbers of destitute women
lined up outside the offices of incompetent abortionists for hire. See LAWRENCE LADER, A
PRIVATE MATTER 28 (1995). But see HULL & HOFFER, supra note 21, at 66 (claiming that
although Sanger publicly opposed abortion, she privately believed that “ ‘women should be
free to terminate pregnancies where it is not desired’ ”).
165. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); infra Part II.
166. See HULL & HOFFER, supra note 21, at 70.
167. See id.
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ring, stating that a single abortion clinic “ranked with the Capone
crime syndicate.”168 These sensational stories and the resulting trials,
however, were exceptions rather than the norm.169
Despite the continued illegality of abortions, from the mid-1940s
to the 1960s doctors were given considerable leeway to decide when
a pregnancy constituted a risk to the mother’s health.170 Nevertheless,
the physician choosing to defend abortions under the therapeutic
exception provisions171 took a grave risk, as the danger that a prose-
cutor might choose to pursue an indictment was a real concern.172
Furthermore, as a result of these risks, hospitals imposed strict rules,
and abortions needed to be approved by special committees or boards
of directors.173 This obviously had the effect of reducing the number
of hospital abortions.174
Although the pro-choice movement had yet to develop, several
organizations and scholars began to give abortion greater attention.
The National Committee on Maternal Health held a conference in
New York in 1942 on “The Abortion Problem.”175 In April, 1955,
Planned Parenthood hosted a conference in New York on “Abortion
in the United States.”176 One common theme in these discussions
was that despite the illegality of abortions, procedure abortion rates
were still high.177 Dr. Mary Calderone, participated in one of these
conferences titled “Therapeutic Abortion” in 1954, and noted several
conclusions that the symposium had reached, including: (1) abortion
in hospitals was no longer a dangerous procedure; (2) pregnant women
were continuing to obtain abortions in large numbers; and, (3) im-
proper procedures used in many illegal abortions was a public health
concern that needed to be addressed.178
By 1955, however, abortions had become dramatically safer.179
With the combined effects of improved techniques, analgesics, antibi-
otics, and antiseptics, the mother was safer than delivering a child.180
168. Id.
169. See id. at 71.
170. Id. at 72; see also infra Part II for a further discussion of the ways in which doctors
tried to get around the anti-abortion laws.
171. See infra Part II.
172. See HULL & HOFFER, supra note 21, at 72.
173. Id. at 72–73.
174. Id.
175. EVA R. RUBIN, THE ABORTION CONTROVERSY: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 37 (1994)
[hereinafter THE ABORTION CONTROVERSY].
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Mary Steichen Calderone, Illegal Abortion as a Public Health Problem, 50 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 7, 948, 948–53 (1960).
179. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 13, at 454.
180. Id. at 457.
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These advances “precipitated—for the first time—a deep culture-
wide debate on abortion.”181 Sociologist Nanette Davis explained that
before abortion became safe, the practice was considered as a “lesser
evil” or “act of desperation.” But the advances in science made abor-
tion truly a “choice.”182
The first major vocal challenge to abortion involved a series of
lectures delivered by law professor Glanville Williams at Columbia
University School of Law in 1956.183 Although not a member of
the American Law Institute, Professor Williams was asked to par-
ticipate in drafting the Model Penal Code (MPC), which would play
an important role in abortion reform.184 Williams argued that abor-
tion should be legal before the point of viability, which he placed at
twenty-eight weeks.185 This argument became the standard for abor-
tion proponents.186
II. THE TIDE CHANGES
Above all, we must achieve complete repeal of all
existing abortion statutes, eliminating abortion from
every criminal code, ending forever the feudal degra-
dation of women that lumps them with criminals on
the statute books.
—Lawrence Lader187
A. The Liberalization Movement (1960–1973)
In 1962, Sherri Finkbine, a mother of four and well-known tele-
vision personality, sought an abortion after she had unintentionally
taken thalidomide and faced the very real possibility that her child
would be born deformed.188 In this instance, “[a]lthough there was a
universal chorus of horror against the drug itself, hardly a newspaper
181. BEVERLY WILDUNG HARRISON, OUR RIGHT TO CHOOSE: TOWARD A NEW ETHIC OF
ABORTION, 168, 194, 201–30 (1983).
182. NANETTE DAVIS, FROM CRIME TO CHOICE, at xiii, 3–4 (1985).
183. GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 220–21 (1957,
reprinted 1972). For alternative views on the first challenges to abortion laws, see NANETTE
DAVIS, FROM CRIME TO CHOICE 4 (1985) (identifying the Kinsey Report); KERRY JACOBY,
SOULS, BODIES, SPIRITS: THE DRIVE TO ABOLISH ABORTION SINCE 1973, at 3 (1998) (identify-
ing a book by Joseph Fletcher); LESLIE REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME: WOMEN,
MEDICINE, AND LAW IN THE UNITED STATES, 1867–1973, at 220 (1997) (identifying the 1955
Planned Parenthood Conference).
184. See infra Part II.
185. WILLIAMS, supra note 183, at 225–33.
186. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 13, at 595.
187. Introduction to LAWRENCE LADER, ABORTION II: MAKING THE REVOLUTION (1973)
[hereinafter LADER 2].
188. See LADER 1, supra note 127, at 1.
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or pulpit in the country attacked the hypocrisy of the system that
denied this mother the right to protect herself and her family, and
eventually forced her to seek abortion in Sweden.”189
By 1965, forty-nine of fifty-one American jurisdictions (fifty
states, plus the District of Columbia) had criminal abortion stat-
utes, limiting abortions to the single purpose of saving the life of the
mother.
Violations of these abortion laws carried serious repercussions
for all parties. However, penalties were harshest for physicians, who
confronted the possibility of losing their licenses to practice and facing
criminal charges.190 In fifteen states, the punishment for providing
an abortion was a maximum sentence of ten years’ imprisonment.191
Fourteen states also made it a crime for women to obtain an abor-
tion; however, these patients were rarely prosecuted and the laws
were more often used as leverage to coerce women to testify against
their doctors.192
In 1962, the American Law Institute published its Model Penal
Code, which included an abortion statute, extending the justifiable
reasons for abortion to include the risk of grave impairment to the
mother’s physical or mental health, the risk of bearing a child with a
grave physical or mental defect, and pregnancy resulting from rape,
incest or other felonious intercourse.193 These reforms were supported
by the medical profession, led by obstetrician Alan Guttmacher and
his brother Manfred, a prominent psychiatrist.194 Colorado became
the first state to follow the American Law Institute’s recommendation
by reforming its abortion law in 1967.195
The 1965 decision in Griswold v. Connecticut196 was the catalyst
for bringing the abortion debate to the forefront of American politics.197
The case involved a clinic, which provided birth control counseling
services and distributed contraceptives.198 Writing for the majority,
Justice William O. Douglas found that the case “concern[ed] a relation-
ship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental
constitutional guarantees.”199 Scholars soon took notice of the fact that
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (1962).
194. See HULL & HOFFER, supra note 21, at 97.
195. See Rachel Benson Gold, Lessons from Before Roe: Will Past Be Prologue?, 6 THE
GUTTMACHER REPORT ON PUB. POL’Y 8, 9 (2003).
196. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 479 (1965).
197. ROSEMARY NOSSIFF, BEFORE ROE: ABORTION POLICY IN THE STATES 37 (2001).
198. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480.
199. Id. at 485.
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by establishing a right to privacy, the Court had opened the possibil-
ity “for an attack upon significant aspects of the abortion laws.” 200
The California Supreme Court issued the first decision extending
Griswold’s privacy doctrine to women as individuals, declaring that:
The fundamental right of the woman to choose whether to bear
children follows from the Supreme Court’s and this court’s re-
peated acknowledgment of a “right to privacy” or “liberty” in
matters related to marriage, family, and sex.201
Shortly thereafter, a federal district court explicitly acknowledged
that this right “may well include the right to remove an unwanted
child at least in the early stages of pregnancy.” 202
In New York, a partnership of women’s groups, doctors, the
Community of Action Legal Services Office, and other activists chal-
lenged the state’s abortion statute on the grounds of unconstitutional-
ity.203 Although the statute was repealed before trial,204 the challenge
is noteworthy.
From 1966 through 1972, the year before Roe was decided, thir-
teen states205 amended their abortion statutes along the lines sug-
gested in the Code.206 Alaska, Hawaii, New York, and Washington
repealed their abortion laws altogether.207 In 1970, Hawaii legalized
all abortions of non-viable fetuses performed by licensed physicians.208
The public debate that took place in New York during the late
1960s typified the abortion movement’s struggle. In January 1968,
Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller appointed an eleven member com-
mission209 under the leadership of Charles W. Froessel, a retired Judge
200. Thomas I. Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MICH. L. REV. 219,
232 (1965). For other scholarly reviews supporting Griswold as a basis for the constitu-
tionality of abortion, see Roy Lucas, Federal Constitutional Limits on the Enforcement
and Administration of State Abortion Statutes, 46 N.C.L. REV. 730, 752 (1968); see also
LADER 2, supra note 187, at 12.
201. People v. Belous, 458 P.2d 194, 199 (Cal. 1969).
202. United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032, 1035 (D.D.C. 1969), rev’d, 402 U.S. 62
(1971). For a further discussion of Vuitch, see LADER 2, supra note 187, at 1–16.
203. Abramowicz v. Lefkowitz, 305 F. Supp. 1030, 1030–32 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
204. See supra Part I.A.
205. Rachel Benson Gold, Abortion in the United States: Two Centuries of Experience,
ISSUES IN BRIEF (Guttmacher Institute 1982) (specifying Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Maryland, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon,
South Carolina, and Virginia).
206. See id.
207. Id; see supra notes 5–20 and accompanying text.
208. 1970 HAW. SESS. LAWS c. 1, § 2; Am. L. 2006, c. 35, § 2; Am. L. 2008, c. 5, § 18.
Codified at HAW. REV. STAT. § 453-16 (2013).
209. The Commission was created shortly after the well-publicized prosecution of a
physician for the death of a young college student who obtained an illicit abortion. F.B.I.
Presses Hunt In Abortion Death, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1962, at 50.
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of the New York Court of Appeals, to study the state of abortion law
in New York.210 The Governor’s Commission Appointed to Review
New York State’s Abortion Law issued its report in March 1968.211
The Governor’s Commission Report was instrumental in changing
the law in New York, and was the underpinning for Roe.
All members of the Commission agreed that abortion to preserve
the mother’s life was justifiable, but a substantial majority found this
single ground too limited.212 They felt that this lone justification pre-
vented doctors from practicing what they believed to be good medicine,
and placed a “physician in an intolerable conflict between his medi-
cal duty to his patient and his duty as a citizen to uphold the law.” 213
In the past, New York doctors had attempted to circumvent the State’s
abortion laws by using the diagnosis “psychiatric indication (threat-
ened suicide),” to justify abortions,214 even though the actual suicide
rate of pregnant women was much lower than that of women of the
same age who were not pregnant.215 Doctors also justified abortions
for women who contracted rubella in the first trimester, even though
the disease threatened only the health of the child, and not the life of
the mother.216 Despite these justifications, prior to the liberalization
of New York’s abortion law, only four-hundred legal abortions were
performed within the State annually.217
At the outset of their discussion, the majority of the Commission
declined to enter into the theological debate that had divided members
of the clergy. These words still ring true today:
The minority of this Commission virtually base their entire posi-
tion on the premise that, by modern secular standards, the foetus
is at all times a human being, possessed of corresponding legal
rights. The premise is clearly fallacious. Let it first be noted that
we are in the State of New York, governed by its laws. The dif-
ferences in views among the early and modern theologians and
their followers are of little assistance to us here.218
210. See REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR’S COMM’N, supra note 15, at 7. For a summary of
Judge Froessel’s distinguished career see Cyril Means, Jr., Charles William Froessel, 18
N.Y.L.F. 289 (1972).
211. REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR’S COMM’N, supra note 15, at 7.
212. Id. at 8–9, 14.
213. Id. at 16–17.
214. Id. at 15.
215. Richard Bruce Sloan, The Unwanted Pregnancy, 280 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1206,
1207 (1969).
216. See REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR’S COMM’N, supra note 15, at 15.
217. Steven Polgar & Ellen S. Fried, The Bad Old Days: Clandestine Abortions Among
the Poor in New York City before Liberalization of the Abortion Law, 8 FAM. PLAN. PERSP.
3, 125 (1976).
218. REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR’S COMM’N, supra note 15, at 13.
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Inasmuch as no law could compel a woman to have an abor-
tion, the “morals” of abortion, said the majority, was the province of
“religious institutions and philosophic traditions” and not an issue
on which they could be expected to give an opinion.219 In fact, the re-
port tracked the history of the entire controversy from both moral
and secular points of view.220 It noted that there was a strong differ-
ence of opinion among religious scholars concerning the point at
which life begins and, accordingly, whether, and at what point, abor-
tion was permissible.221
The majority of the Governor’s Commission found that even if
the lowest estimates were used, approximately 200,000 abortions were
performed in the United States each year.222 It found that the restric-
tive laws created an abortion racket, operated by doctors without
regard for the law, and performed by untrained persons who used the
most primitive instruments under the most unsanitary conditions.223
They also found that New York’s restrictive law unfairly discriminated
against the poor.224 New York’s underprivileged could neither travel
to other jurisdictions where abortion was safe and legal, nor pay the
prices charged by the in-state doctors who were willing to perform
illegal abortions.225 In effect, the poor often faced the choice between
having a child that they could not afford to care for, or turning to one
of the incompetent persons willing to sell their services for cheap. The
majority cited estimations suggesting that 5,000 to 10,000 maternal
deaths per year could be attributed to “botched, illegal abortions.” 226
While many individuals and groups had urged the adoption of
an “abortion upon request” statute, the majority of the Governor’s
Commission recommended that abortion be justified only if one of
several conditions were satisfied.227 These conditions were: (1) to pre-
serve the life of the woman; (2) to prevent grave impairment of the
219. Id. at 34.
220. Id. at 13.
221. The Commission heard from Mrs. William S. Harrington, who spoke for the
Episcopal Diocese of Long Island and who submitted a resolution that had been adopted
by a convention of both clergy and lay people, in support of liberalization of the abortion
laws. Hearing Minutes, p. 100 et seq. Recognizing both points of view, she said that
Episcopalians on Long Island did not believe that such a stance was “anti-religious,” but
was, on the contrary, “moral and humane and thoroughly consistent with our Christian
beliefs.” Id. at 102.
222. Id. at 15.
223. Id. at 15–17.
224. Id. at 23–25.
225. Id. at 23–25.
226. Id. at 15. But see id. at 15–16 (noting that these estimates might be exaggerated, but
that “even though it may be in the hundreds—it must be contrasted with the relative safety
of the procedure when performed by a qualified physician under hospital conditions”).
227. Id. at 17.
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physical or mental health of the woman; (3) where the woman had a
permanent physical or mental condition which would render her in-
capable of caring for the child if it were born; (4) where there was a
substantial risk that the child, if born, would be so grossly malformed
or have serious physical or mental abnormalities as to be permanently
incapable of caring for himself/herself; (5) where the pregnancy re-
sulted from rape in the first degree; (6) where the pregnancy resulted
from incest; (7) where the pregnancy occurred out of wedlock while the
woman was under sixteen years of age, and she remained unmarried
at the time of the abortion; and, (8) where the woman already had
four living children.228
The majority concluded that:
to be workable, an abortion statute must recognize the central
position of the physician, and manifest faith and confidence in
the medical profession as a whole. To enact restrictions on abor-
tion without regard to good medical practice is futile. Any statute
affecting so vitally the medical field must of necessity rely upon
the integrity of the physician, and leave to already established
procedures the discipline of the comparatively few unethical or
unscrupulous doctors who refuse to practice within the framework
of reasonable legislation.229
Three members of the Commission filed a minority report, con-
tending that child en ventre sa mere (“in his/her mother’s belly”) had
constitutional and legal rights to live.230 They anticipated that the so-
cial consequences of a liberalized abortion law would be an increase
in abortions to the point where the abortion rate would eventually
outstrip the birth rate, a dilution in the traditional concept of the
sanctity of human life, and the erosion of family values.231
The Commission’s recommendations for a liberalized abortion
law were proposed as bills to the Legislature in 1968 and 1969, but
failed to pass on both occasions.232 On July 1, 1970, the New York
Legislature passed the “justifiable abortional act,” 233 which amended
Section 125.05 of the New York Penal Law, providing that “[t]he
submission by a female to an abortional act is justifiable when she
228. Id. at 20–23.
229. Id. at 17–18.
230. Id. at 62. The minority began and ended with the proposition that a “fetus is a
human child; his life is sacred.”
231. Id. at 62.
232. See LAWRENCE LADER 2, supra note 187, at 109 (outlining the history of state
abortion law reform, particularly in New York).
233. Virginia Nolan Duin, New York’s Abortion Reform Law: Unanswered Questions,
37 ALB. L. REV. 22, 22 (1972).
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believes that it is being committed by a duly licensed physician, act-
ing under a reasonable belief that such act is necessary to preserve
her life, or, within twenty-four weeks from the commencement of
her pregnancy.” 234
At the time, New York had a Republican Governor and Republi-
cans controlled both houses of the State Legislature.235 Passage in the
New York legislature turned on a last-minute change in a vote.236
The amendment was immediately met with opposition.237 Pro-
fessor Robert Byrn, of Fordham University School of Law, who had
been a member of the Governor’s Commission, led an offensive to the
New York Court of Appeals in 1972.238 Byrn attempted to have him-
self appointed legal guardian of the fictitious “Infant Roe,” meant to
“symboliz[e] all unborn fetuses between four and twenty-four weeks
of gestation scheduled for abortion.” 239 The New York Court of Appeals
upheld the statutory provision against this constitutional challenge,
holding that embryos are not recognized as legal persons, and have
no right to life under the state and federal constitutions.240
In 1972, the New York Legislature voted to repeal the statute,
but Governor Rockefeller vetoed it, saying:
I do not believe it right for one group to impose its vision of mo-
rality on an entire society . . . . Neither is it just or practical for
the state to attempt to dictate the innermost personal beliefs and
conduct of its citizens. The extremes of personal vilification and
political coercion brought to bear on members of the Legislature
raise serious doubts that the votes to repeal the reforms repre-
sented the will of a majority . . .
The truth is that this repeal of the 1970 reforms would not end
abortions. It would only end abortions under safe and supervised
medical conditions. The truth is that a safe abortion would remain
the optional choice of the well-to-do woman, while the poor would
again be seeking abortions at a grave risk to life in back-room
abortion mills.
The truth is that, under the present law, no woman is compelled
to undergo abortion. Those whose personal and religious principles
234. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05(3) (McKinney 1972) (amending N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 125.05(3) (1965)).
235. Richard Perez-Pena, ’70 Abortion Law: New York Said Yes, Stunning the Nation,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2000, at A1.
236. Id.
237. See LADER 2, supra note 187, at 159.
238. See id. at 163; MOHR, supra note 20.
239. Id.
240. See Byrn v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 286 N.E.2d 887, 890 (1972), appeal
dismissed, 410 U.S. 949 (1973).
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forbid abortion are in no way compelled against their convictions.
Every woman has the right to make her own choice.241
B. The Decision in Roe and its Aftermath (1973–1982)
By 1973, abortion statutes had been challenged on several consti-
tutional grounds, including vagueness,242 privacy,243 and equal protec-
tion of the laws.244 Based on these developments, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to hear two cases challenging the right of govern-
ment to limit access to abortion.245 In Roe v. Wade, the Court consid-
ered a challenge to a Texas law outlawing abortion in all cases, except
those in which the life of the mother was at risk.246 The second case,
Doe v. Bolton, focused on a Georgia law that allowed women to termi-
nate a pregnancy only if either her life or her health were in danger.247
In both cases, lower federal courts had declared the statutes unconsti-
tutional, holding that denying a woman the right to decide whether to
carry a pregnancy to term violated basic privacy and liberty interests
enumerated by the Constitution.248
In Roe, Justice Harry Blackmun, writing for the majority, con-
cluded that constitutional rights to privacy and liberty protected a
woman’s rights to terminate her pregnancy.249 The Court held that
access to abortion is a fundamental right, and only a “compelling state
interest” could justify the enactment of state laws or regulations that
limit this right.250 Nonetheless, the Court also recognized that the
state has an “important and legitimate interest in preserving and
protecting the health of the woman” and “the potentiality of human
life” inside her.251
241. Jay Maeder, Certain Religious Convictions Repealing the Abortion Law, May 1972
Chapter 397, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 10, 2001), http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/news
/religious-convictions-repealing-abortion-law-1972-chapter-397-article-1.935928.
242. See, e.g., United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 64 (1971) (finding that a statute was
not unconstitutionally vague); Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293, 295 (E.D. Wis. 1970);
State v. Abodeely, 179 N.W.2d 347, 354 (Iowa 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 936 (1971). But
see People v. Belous, 458 P.2d 194, 205 (Cal. 1969) (“we are satisfied that the statute may
not be construed to adopt the relative safety test as against a claim of vagueness . . . ”).
243. See, e.g., Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741, 745 (N.D. Ohio 1970). But see People
v. Belous, 458 P.2d 194, 205 (Cal. 1969).
244. E.g., Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741, 747 (N.D. Ohio 1970); State v. Abodeely,
189 N.W.2d 347, 354 (Iowa 1970).
245. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 113 (1973); see also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179,
179 (1973).
246. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 113 (1973).
247. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 179 (1973).
248. See Roe, 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1222 (N.D. Tex. 1970), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 410
U.S. 113 (1973); see also Doe, 319 F. Supp. 1048, 1056 (N.D. Ga. 1973), modified, 410 U.S.
179 (1973).
249. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
250. Id. at 156–57.
251. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
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To determine when a state’s legitimate concern for maternal
and fetal protection rises to the level of compelling interest, Justice
Blackmun created a three-tiered legal framework based on the nine
month period of pregnancy, which gave progressively greater inter-
est and regulatory latitude for each successive tier.252
The Court found that the state has no real interest in limiting
abortion to protect a woman’s health during the first trimester, given
that the risks associated with abortion are actually lower than those
associated with childbirth.253 During this period, states can only im-
pose basic health safeguards, such as requiring that the procedure be
performed by a qualified health professional, but cannot limit access
to abortion in any way.254
The point of fetal viability typically takes place between twenty-
four and twenty-eight weeks into a pregnancy.255 The interim stage
between the end of the first trimester and this point of viability is the
period in which a state may regulate the abortion procedure in ways
that are reasonably related to maternal health.256 Regulations must
be directed toward ensuring maternal health, and cannot be aimed at
protecting a fetus, or limiting access to abortion services.257 Thus, a
state law requiring a doctor to describe the risks associated with the
abortion procedure to a woman seeking an abortion before she may
consent to the procedure would be constitutional only if the require-
ment aimed to protect maternal health and was not created to dis-
suade a woman from terminating her pregnancy.258
The third tier encompasses the period after the point of fetal
viability.259 During this time, the state has an interest in protecting
“potential life” and can even ban abortion, as long as the procedure is
still allowed in cases where the life or health of the mother is at risk.260
In Doe, the same seven justice majority largely restated and
fleshed out its ruling in Roe.261 The Court found that state regula-
tions that create procedural obstacles to abortion, such as the require-
ment that an abortion be performed in a hospital or be approved by
two doctors, violate a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy.262
252. Id. at 162–63.
253. Id. at 149.
254. See id. at 150.
255. Id. at 160.
256. Id. at 163.
257. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
258. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 967–68 (1982).
259. See id. at 872.
260. Id. at 914–15.
261. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 179 (1973).
262. See id. at 194.
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Reactions to these decisions were mixed. The Roman Catholic
Church immediately voiced its disapproval at the National Conference
of Catholic Bishops on January 24, 1973.263 The conference issued a
statement, which claimed that the Court had “deprived the unborn
child of his or her human rights.” 264 Edwin A. Roberts, Jr., writing for
the National Observer, called the decision “puzzling both in substance,
for what it allows, and in style, for the way it allows it.” 265 In Congress,
Senator James B. Allen filed a speech condemning the decision, a
sentiment joined by Senator James L. Buckley and Representative
Lawrence J. Hogan.266 A number of law professors likewise criticized
the Court’s rationale, including John Hart Ely and Robert M. Byrn.267
On the other hand, the Washington Post called the decision “both
wise and sound.” 268 Law professor Lawrence Friedman stated that
although “neither the Constitution nor the Court can accommodate
all sides,” the decision in Roe was not out of the ordinary and was
based on precedent.269 These conflicting views demonstrated that the
controversy surrounding abortion was far from over, and that propo-
nents and critics alike would continue to mount legal challenges to
state abortion laws.
C. Twenty-Five Years of Legal Abortions (1982–2007)
In the years immediately following Roe, the Supreme Court grap-
pled with a host of issues that arose from their landmark decision.
New laws involved requirements of informed consent,270 parental
consent,271 spousal consent,272 and waiting periods for women seek-
ing abortions.273 The Court generally struck down most of these laws
regulating abortion and upheld only a few that did not significantly
limit a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy.274
263. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, Statement of the Committee for Pro-
Life Affairs (1973), reprinted in THE ABORTION CONTROVERSY, supra note 175, at 141.
264. Id. at 143.
265. Edwin A. Roberts, Jr., High Court’s Abortion Legislation, NAT’L OBSERVER, Mar. 10,
1973, reprinted in THE ABORTION CONTROVERSY, supra note 175, at 147.
266. THE ABORTION CONTROVERSY, supra note 175, at 152.
267. Id. at 160–66.
268. Abortion: Out of the 19th Century, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 1973, reprinted in THE
ABORTION CONTROVERSY, supra note 175, at 144.
269. Lawrence M. Friedman, The Conflict over Constitutional Legitimacy, in THE
ABORTION DISPUTE AND THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 22–23, 27–28 (1983).
270. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. at 838, 844 (1992).
271. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416,
426 (1983).
272. See, e.g., id.
273. Id.
274. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469 (1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 438
(1977); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977).
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Meanwhile, abortion politics entered the election arena as politi-
cians began to voice their views, to improve their chances of election
and reelection.275 President Gerald Ford supported the passage of a
constitutional amendment to allow the states to regulate abortion
policy.276 In the early 1980s, President Ronald Reagan approved a pro-
posed anti-abortion constitutional amendment and a “right to life”
bill.277 However, neither of these measures passed in Congress.278
The pro-life movement redoubled its efforts. Dr. Bernard Nathan-
son, one of the founders of NARAL, had reversed his position on the
abortion controversy, and released a film entitled Silent Scream,
which presented footage of an actual abortion.279 Nathanson, nar-
rating the film, referred to the fetus’ opening its mouth as “a silent
scream.” 280 Although modern medical science has since demonstrated
that a fetus, for example, cannot actually feel pain, at the time the
film was released it caused much reaction.281
In some instances, the anti-abortion movement even turned vio-
lent. The first bombings of abortion clinics began in the early 1980s.282
When Ronald Reagan left office, seventy-seven abortion clinics had
been bombed and another 117 burned.283 These acts of terrorism were
soon attributed to the actions of three men, all of whom were Christian
religious zealots.284
Although Roe remained controversial, the Court remained stead-
fast in its adherence to the decision until 1989 when it decided Webster
v. Reproductive Health Services.285 Webster involved a Missouri stat-
ute that barred public facilities from being used to conduct abortions,
and prohibited public health workers from performing abortions un-
less the life of the mother was at risk.286 The statute also defined life
as beginning at conception, and directed physicians to perform fetal
viability tests on women seeking abortion who were twenty weeks
pregnant or more.287
275. See HULL & HOFFER, supra note 21, at 189.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 207.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 209.
280. Id. at 210.
281. See e.g., Fetus Can’t Feel Pain Before 24 Weeks, Study Says, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(June 25, 2010), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/37920310/#.UoLTfax3fMh; New York Times
Examines ‘Highly Complex’ Science on Fetal Pain, NAT’L PARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN AND
FAMILIES (Sept. 17, 2013), http://go.nationalpartnership.org/site/News2?abbr=daily2_&
page=NewsArticle&id=41972.
282. See HULL & HOFFER, supra note 21, at 210.
283. Id. at 211.
284. Id.
285. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 490 (1989).
286. Id. at 499.
287. Id. at 501.
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Chief Justice William Rehnquist, in upholding the statute, stated
that the law’s declaration that life begins at conception did not con-
tradict Roe because the declaration was contained in the preamble,
and “this [did] not by its terms regulate abortion.” 288 The majority also
ruled that prohibiting the use of government workers, or facilities to
perform abortions, is acceptable because the right to an abortion es-
tablished in Roe does not include the right to government assistance
in obtaining one.289 The decision also held that the requirement of
viability testing at twenty weeks was constitutional.290
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Byron White and
Anthony Kennedy, also argued for the elimination of the second
tier of Roe’s system, which only allows laws aimed at protecting the
mother’s health.291 Rehnquist argued that the framework had come
to resemble a “web of legal rules,” rather than a “constitutional doc-
trine.” 292 He also maintained that the state has an interest in pro-
tecting potential life before viability.293
Justice Antonin Scalia concurred in the judgment, but argued
that the plurality opinion was “indecisive” and “stingy” and that Roe
should be overturned.294 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, also concurred
with the judgment, albeit for very different reasons.295 Unlike her col-
leagues in the majority, O’Connor argued that Roe’s trimester system,
while problematic, should neither be modified nor overturned.296 She
determined that the testing requirement was in fact, constitutional
because it does not impose an “undue burden” on a woman consider-
ing an abortion.297
Despite the fractured decision in Webster, the stage was set for
the significant changes that were established by Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.298 Casey involved a challenge
to a wide-ranging abortion law that included an informed consent
288. Id. at 506 (stating that the preamble can be read simply as the type of value judg-
ment that a State is entitled to make).
289. “The Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmental
aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests
of which the government may not deprive the individual.” Id. at 491 (citing DeShaney v.
Winnebago Cnty. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 194–95 (1989)).
290. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 495–99 (1989).
291. See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 494 (1989).
292. Id. at 494.
293. Id. at 519 (citing Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. Of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 795 (1986) (Burger, J., dissenting)) (emphasis added).
294. Webster, 492 U.S. at 532–37.
295. Id. at 522.
296. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 529–30 (1989).
297. Id. at 530.
298. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 838 (1992).
152 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW               [Vol. 20:123
requirement, as well as a twenty-four hour waiting period for women
seeking abortions.299
In Casey, Justices Sandra Day O’Connor, Anthony Kennedy,
and David Souter overruled the trimester framework established by
Roe,300 and instead adopted the “undue burden” language from Justice
O’Connor’s opinion in Webster as the new standard to test the con-
stitutionality of all state abortion regulations before viability.301 The
opinion held that an undue burden existed when
a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable
fetus. A statute with this purpose is invalid because the means
chosen by the State to further the interest in potential life must
be calculated to inform the woman’s free choice, not hinder it.
And a statute which, while furthering the interest in potential
life or some other valid state interest, has the effect of placing a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s choice cannot be
considered a permissible means of serving its legitimate ends.302
Casey abandoned a strict scrutiny analysis when considering abor-
tion.303 Despite this significant change in the abortion doctrine, the
Court reaffirmed several sections of the holding in Roe.304 Most im-
portantly, the Court reaffirmed a woman’s right to have an abortion
before viability without “undue interference from the State,” and that
“[b]efore viability, the State’s interests are not strong enough to sup-
port a prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a substantial obsta-
cle to the woman’s effective right to elect the procedure.” 305 Second,
the Court held that a state may restrict abortions after viability, so
long as exceptions are made for the protection of the woman’s “life
or health.” 306 And finally, that the states have a “legitimate interest”
in protecting both the health of the woman and the “fetus that may
become a child.” 307
Coinciding with the decision in Casey, President Clinton soon
appointed Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer to
the Supreme Court, both of whom supported a woman’s right to an
abortion.308 Additionally, pro-choice supporters won a major victory
299. See id. at 844.
300. Id. at 872.
301. Id. at 876.
302. Id. at 877.
303. Id. at 953.
304. Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1992).
305. Id. at 846.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. See Richard L. Berke, The Supreme Court: The Overview; Clinton Names Ruth
Ginsberg, Advocate for Women, to Court, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 1993), http://www.nytimes
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in 1993, when Congress passed the Freedom of Access to Clinic En-
trances Act (FACE), which made it a crime for protestors to prevent
women, through force or threat, from entering clinics.309
Gonzales v. Carhart310 arose in response to the passage of the
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act in 2003,311 which prohibits dilation
and evacuation (D&E), during the second trimester.312 At the time the
Act was passed, D&E abortions were the most common type of sec-
ond trimester abortion in the United States.313 In a 5–4 decision, the
Court upheld the act, holding that it did not constitute an “undue
burden” on the right to terminate a pregnancy.314 Additionally, the
majority found that a health exception to the prohibition was unnec-
essary because “whether the Act creates significant health risks for
women has been a contested factual question.” 315
If Casey “opened the door to more regulation than had been ac-
ceptable under Roe,” the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Carhart
blew the door off its hinges.316 The holding was seen as a victory by
anti-abortion forces, who saw an opportunity to “chip away” at the
abortion doctrine established by Roe.317 Equally as important, the 2010
midterm elections created a political shift, as “ ‘many of the newly
elected governors and legislators are solidly anti-abortion, causing
advocates of abortion rights to brace for a year of even tougher bat-
tles than usual.’ ” 318 These fears appear to have been well founded,
considering the record-breaking number of abortion regulations and
restrictions passed by the states in 2011 and 2012.319
.com/1993/06/15/us/supreme-court-overview-clinton-names-ruth-ginsburg-advocate-for
-women-court.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm; Aaron Epstein, High Court Nominee Is
Expected To Sail Through Confirmation Hearings May Offer Insights into the Judge,
Whose Appeal Spans the Political Spectrum, INQUIRER (July 10, 1994), http://articles
.philly.com/1994-07-10/news/25845310_1_judge-stephen-g-breyer-utah-and-strom
-thurmond-high-court-nominee.
309. 18 U.S.C.A. § 248 (2012).
310. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 124 (2007).
311. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 1, 117 Stat. 1201,
1201 (2003) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2003)).
312. See Morgan Arnett, Update: Phasing Out Abortion: One Step Closer to Terminating
a Woman’s Constitutional Right, in Gonzales v. Carhart, 24 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 597, 604
(2007) (discussing the process of D&E abortions).
313. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 135 (2007) (citing Planned Parenthood Fed’n
of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 961 (N.D. Cal. 2004)).
314. Id. at 160–61.
315. Id. at 161.
316. John A. Robertson, Abortion and Technology: Sonograms, Fetal Pain, Viability, and
Early Prenatal Diagnosis, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 327, 329 (2011).
317. See id. at 329–30.
318. Id. at 330 (quoting Erik Eckholm, Across Country, Lawmakers Push Abortion
Curbs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2011, at A14).
319. See supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text; see also infra Part III.
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In spite of these setbacks, it is important to note that Carhart
reiterated the fundamental holding of Roe: Before viability, a State
“may not prohibit any woman from making the ultimate decision to
terminate her pregnancy.” 320 The majority also wrote that the undue
burden standard remains the test to judge the constitutionality of pre-
viability abortion regulations.321 With this in mind, we now turn to
an examination of some of the most recent anti-abortion laws.
III. A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF RECENT STATE
RESTRICTIONS ON ABORTION RIGHTS
Seizing upon language in Carhart and Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,322 which allowed some state reg-
ulation of abortion providers,323 members of various state legislatures
have sought to implement major restrictions on abortion procedures
and access to reproductive healthcare.324 Although the Court had not
overturned Roe, anti-abortion lawmakers interpreted the rulings in
Carhart and Casey as an indication to reverse Roe’s main principles.325
One line in Chief Justice William Rehnquist’s dissent in Casey stood
out as a banner for further undermining abortion rights: “Roe con-
tinues to exist, but only the way a storefront on a western movie set
exists: a mere façade to give the illusion of reality.” 326
The new strategy became to systematically test the boundaries of
what the Court meant by “undue burden” and “substantial obstacle.”327
Pro-life lawyers hatched a series of legal restrictions that defined the
abortion wars for more than a decade.328 These regulations have re-
sulted in a steady stream of legislation that continues to chip away at
Roe’s principles, in an attempt to limit access to abortion services for
women in the United States.329
State laws can be characterized in the following way: Near-Total
Abortion Bans; Abortion Bans After Twelve Weeks; Biased Counseling
320. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992).
321. Id. at 877.
322. Id. at 878.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 833.
325. Roe v. Wade: Then and Now, CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS (July 01, 2007), http://
reproductiverights.org/en/document/roe-v-wade-then-and-now.
326. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 954 (1992).
327. Who Decides? The Status of Women’s Reproductive Rights in the United States,
NARAL PRO-CHOICE AMERICA & NARAL PRO-CHOICE AMERICA FOUND. 10–21 (21st ed.
2012) [hereinafter NARAL], available at http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/assets/download
-files/2011-who-decides.pdf.
328. See CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS, supra note 325.
329. NARAL, supra note 327, at 10–20.
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and Mandatory Delays; Counseling Bans and Gag Rules; Insurance
Prohibition for Abortion; Refusal to Provide Medical Services; Restric-
tions on Low-Income Women’s Access to Abortion; Restrictions on
Young Women’s Access to Abortion; and Targeted Regulation of Abor-
tion Providers (TRAP).330
This section will provide an overview of the current abortion re-
strictions that have been enacted by the states. Most of these laws are
clearly unconstitutional, and fly in the face of Roe.331 Several state
and federal courts have agreed with this judgment.332
An Overview of Recent Abortion Restrictions in the States
Fifteen states333 have near-total criminal bans on abortion that
are clearly unconstitutional.334 Louisiana and Utah enacted the bans
in 1991, almost two decades after Roe was decided.335 Louisiana, Mis-
sissippi, North Dakota and South Dakota have so-called “trigger”
laws that would immediately result in a criminal ban on abortion
should Roe be overturned.336
One type of near-total ban which several states have considered,
are “personhood” bills that would amend the state’s constitution, to
grant legal “personhood” rights to a fetus from the point of fertiliza-
tion.337 These bills are intended to impose near-total bans on abor-
tion;338 however, none have been enacted.339
In 2011, Ohio became the first state to consider a bill that
would ban abortion as soon as a fetal heartbeat can be detected.340
This “heartbeat” bill, while not technically a near-total ban, would
effectively outlaw abortion in most circumstances, with no excep-
tions for rape, incest, or fetal anomaly because a fetal heartbeat can
detected as early as six weeks into a pregnancy.341 These laws are
clearly unconstitutional.342
330. Id. at 10.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 11.
333. Id. at 10.
334. Id. at 11.
335. See 1991 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 26 (H.B. 112) (West); 1991 Utah Laws 1 (S.B. 23).
336. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.30 (2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-55 (West
1986); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-31-12 (West 2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-17-5.1
(2005).
337. See, e.g., H.B. No. 1 (Va. 2012).
338. See NARAL, supra note 327, at 10.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. H.B. 125, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011) (as passed by Ohio House,
June 28, 2011).
342. See Jessica L. Knopp, The Unconstitutionality of Ohio’s House Bill 125: The
Heartbeat Bill, 46 AKRON L. REV. 253, 285–86 (2013) (“Under Casey, H.B. 125 places an
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Furthermore, despite Roe’s prohibiting states from banning abor-
tions in the first trimester, “[twenty] states have unconstitutional and
unenforceable bans that could outlaw abortion as early as the twelfth
week of pregnancy, with no exception to protect a woman’s health.” 343
Nebraska enacted a pre-viability abortion ban that prohibits
access to abortion care after twenty weeks,344 and five states followed
this path.345 While the original Nebraska ban rests rhetorically on
the claim of fetal pain as its justification, its sponsors readily admit-
ted that it was intended as a challenge to Roe v. Wade.346 In fact, the
true intent of these laws has become clearer as several states intro-
duced twenty-week bans that were not predicated on fetal pain.347
Instead, they ban abortion pre-viability, disregarding Supreme Court
precedent.348
The idea that a fetus can feel pain at twenty weeks was put forth
by Dr. Kanwaljeet Anand, a University of Tennessee professor, but
his theory lacks medical support.349 In fact, available medical evidence
rejects such a claim. The best evidence on the point at which a fetus
can feel pain comes from a 2005 review of the medical literature on the
subject by the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA).
The article states that:
Pain is an emotional and psychological experience that re-
quires conscious recognition of a noxious stimulus. Consequently,
the capacity for conscious perception of pain can rise only after
thalamocortical pathways begin to function, which may occur in
the third trimester around 29 to 30 weeks’ gestational age, based
on the limited data available. Small-scale histological studies of
undue burden on a woman’s reproductive decision by completely eliminating her decision
to choose abortion, in direct violation of her right to privacy derived from the Fourteenth
Amendment’s concept of liberty. Even if H.B. 125 were enacted as a consent-only bill, it
still arguably places an undue burden in the path of a woman seeking an abortion under
Casey because it would require a woman to acknowledge an extensive amount of infor-
mation prior to exercising her constitutionally protected right to an abortion.”).
343. See NARAL, supra note 327, at 11 (naming AL, AK, FL, ID, IL, IN, IA, KY, MI,
MS, NE, NJ, ND, OK, RI, SC, SD, TN, WV, WI).
344. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-3,102 to 111 (2010).
345. In Edwards v. Beck, No. 4:13CV00224SWW, 2013 WL 2302323 (E.D. Ark. May 23,
2013), the Court granted a preliminary injunction against such a “heartbeat” law as it
essentially prohibited abortions after twelve weeks and a fetus was not viable in twelve
weeks. MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Burdick, No. 1:13-CV-071, 2013 WL 3779740 (D.N.D. July 22,
2013) reached the same conclusion with respect to a North Dakota fetal heartbeat law,
issuing a preliminary injunction.
346. See Burdick, 2013 WL 2302323, at *4.
347. NARAL, supra note 327, at 11.
348. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873 (1992); see also Gonzales v.
Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 171–72 (2007).
349. Robertson, supra note 316, at 368.
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human fetuses have found that thalamocortical fibers begin to
form between 23 and 30 weeks’ gestational age, but these studies
did not specifically examine thalamocortical pathways active in
pain perception.350
Since 2005, no new scientific discoveries have been published
to dispute these findings.351 Thus, the “substantial evidence” refer-
enced by the Nebraska bill is meager, lacking and disputed is not sup-
ported by the majority of the medical community.
A state cannot simply get around the issue of viability by amend-
ing the language of its laws to say, for example, that viability takes
place at twenty weeks. The Tenth Circuit rejected the attempt of the
Utah legislature to do so in Jane L. v. Bangerter.352 The opinion cited
the Supreme Court’s decision in Danforth, which held that the medi-
cal community should be the only ones determining at what point
viability occurs, and not the courts or the legislature.353 The Tenth
Circuit thus struck down the ban, noting that the law prohibited abor-
tions of fetuses that may not have been viable.354
In Isaacson v. Horne,355 the Ninth Circuit struck down an Arizona
statute containing a twenty-week ban.356 The Court explained:
Under controlling Supreme Court precedent, Arizona may not
deprive a woman of the choice to terminate her pregnancy at any
point prior to viability. Section 7 effects such a deprivation, by
prohibiting abortion from twenty weeks gestational age through
fetal viability. The twenty-week law is therefore unconstitutional
under an unbroken stream of Supreme Court authority, beginning
with Roe and ending with [Carhart]. Arizona simply cannot pro-
scribe a woman from choosing to obtain an abortion before the
fetus is viable.357
Thirty-two states have enacted laws that subject women seek-
ing abortions to biased counseling requirements, mandatory delays,
350. Susan J. Lee et al., Fetal Pain: A Systematic Multidisciplinary Review of the
Evidence, 294 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 947 (2005), available at http://jama.jamanetwork.com
/article.aspx?articleid=201429.
351. See I. Glenn Cohen & Sadath Sayeed, Fetal Pain, Abortion, Viability, and the
Constitution, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 235, 239 (2011) (citing Stuart W.G. Derbyshire, Fetal
Pain: Do We Know Enough to Do the Right Thing?, REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS, May 2008,
at 117–26).
352. Jane L. v. Bangerter, 102 F.3d 1112, 1115 (10th Cir. 1996).
353. Id. (citing Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 64 (1976)).
354. Jane L., 102 F.3d at 1115–18.
355. Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F.3d 1213, 1213 (9th Cir. 2013).
356. Id. at 1231.
357. Id.
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or both.358 The first state to do so was South Dakota, purportedly to
ensure a pregnant woman’s voluntary and informed consent before
she underwent an abortion.359 The Act360 contained four major pro-
visions: (1) the Pregnancy Help Center Requirement; (2) the 72-
Hour Requirement; (3) the Risk Factors Requirement; and (4) the
Coercion Provisions.361
The Pregnancy Help Center Requirement required a pregnant
woman to consult with a registered “pregnancy help center” prior to
undergoing an abortion procedure.362 The 72-Hour Requirement estab-
lished a minimum three-day waiting period between the pregnant
woman’s initial consultation with her physician and the abortion.363
The Coercion Provisions imposed a duty on physicians to certify that
the pregnant woman had not been coerced, as explained in the Act.364
Finally, the Risk Factors Requirement established certain informa-
tion, which a physician must tell a pregnant woman with regard to
the “complications” associated with abortion.365
A preliminary injunction was granted by the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of South Dakota.366 The court held that a
provision requiring a woman to visit a pregnancy help center “humili-
ates and degrades her as a human being.” 367
In Delaware, a statute requiring a twenty-four hour waiting pe-
riod was declared unconstitutional because it did not contain a health
exception.368 Despite the Delaware District Court’s ruling, mandatory
waiting periods of twenty-four hours have been declared constitutional
by the Supreme Court.369 Informed consent laws, which go beyond sim-
ply providing information regarding the risks associated with abor-
tion procedures, however, have received a great deal of criticism, and
have recently been challenged in state and federal courts alike.370 The
most recognized and controversial of these informed consent laws
358. See NARAL, supra note 327, at 12; Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Reproductive Choices
and Informed Consent: Fetal Interests, Women’s Identity, and Relational Autonomy, 37
AM. J. L. & MED. 567, 581 n. 89 (2011); see also Alice X. Chen, Crisis Pregnancy Centers:
Impeding the Right to Informed Decision Making, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 933 (2013).
359. NARAL, supra note 327, at 5.
360. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Planned Parenthood of Minn. v. Daugaard, 799 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1060 (D.S.D.
2011).
367. Id. at 1060.
368. Planned Parenthood of Del. v. Brady, 250 F. Supp. 2d 405, 410 (D. Del. 2003)
(striking DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1794(b)).
369. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 969 (1992).
370. Daugaard, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 1052.
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involve statutes that regulate the use of ultrasounds, which are
otherwise a standard tool used by obstetricians to establish the date
of pregnancy,371 have, instead been transformed into an instrument
of harassment.372
An inquiry into the constitutionality of these laws must examine
whether the purpose of these laws is to create “a substantial obstacle
in the path of a woman seeking an abortion.” 373 The Court has found
an undue burden to exist if either the purpose or effect of imposing
a law imposes such an obstacle.374 Proponents of ultrasound require-
ments contend that requiring a woman to view ultrasounds simply
provides additional information.375
For some women, viewing an ultrasound will have no effect on her
decision, but for others, the sight of an unborn fetus with a beating
heart may cause significant distress.376 It is apparent that the primary
purpose behind these laws is to reduce the number of abortions.
A court faced with a challenge to such a law should find that
these ultrasound laws have the effect of creating a substantial ob-
stacle to the right to choose. Laws that have time requirements of two
to twenty-four hours create logistical problems such as scheduling
barriers and increased costs.377 Since the Court has upheld the consti-
tutionality of twenty-four hour mandatory waiting periods, these laws
will likely not be struck down on these grounds alone.378
The psychological effects of having the images and sounds of an
ultrasound placed in front of a woman are surely traumatic. The di-
rector of one abortion clinic noted that “ ‘[n]ot one patient would look
at the screen and they all closed their eyes or turned their heads . . .
But it’s hard to turn your ears off . . . Several of the patients were in
tears afterwards. No one changed their mind.’ ” 379 However, a woman’s
failure to change her mind does not mean she is unburdened by the
traumatic experience. The Oklahoma State Supreme Court implicitly
agreed with this logic in its decision in Pruitt v. Nova Health Systems,
finding that “the challenged measure is facially unconstitutional pur-
suant to Casey and affirmed a permanent injunction.”
371. Robertson, supra note 316, at 347.
372. See, e.g., Stuart v. Huff, 700 F.3d 424, 427 (4th Cir. 2012).
373. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
374. Id.
375. See Robertson, supra note 316, at 350.
376. Id. at 352.
377. Id. at 350.
378. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
379. Robertson, supra note 316, at 352 (quoting Susan Donaldson James, Oklahoma
Abortion Law: No Exceptions, Even Rape, ABC NEWS (Apr. 29, 2010), http://abcnews.go
.com/Health/okla-abortion-law-exceptions-rape/story?id=10507849&singlePage=true).
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Ultrasound laws are also subject to First Amendment challenges
on the grounds that they compel speech.380 State governments must
show that “the compelled speech portions of the Act further a com-
pelling governmental interest and are narrowly tailored to achieve
that interest.” 381
The Fifth Circuit found that a Texas ultrasound law did not
constitute compelled speech, relying on the conclusion in Casey that
“ ‘the giving of truthful, nonmisleading information’ which is ‘rele-
vant . . . to the decision,’ [does] not impose an undue burden on the
woman’s right to an abortion and [is] thus permitted by the Four-
teenth Amendment.” 382
Although the Fifth Circuit interpreted Casey’s general acceptance
of informed consent as rendering all informed consent laws constitu-
tional without qualification, a North Carolina district court pointed
out this is not the case.
In Stuart v. Huff,383 the North Carolina district court enjoined
enforcement of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-21.85, which required that images
of an ultrasound be shown and described to a woman before she could
undergo an abortion, was enjoined because the compelled speech did
not survive First Amendment strict scrutiny. The opinion noted that
“the Act [went] well beyond requiring disclosure of those items tradi-
tionally a part of the informed consent process, which include in this
context the nature and risks of the procedure and the gestational age
of the fetus.” 384 The court further distinguished the North Carolina
law from the statute in Casey, stating that the provision approved in
Casey only required providers to “make available” written materials.385
The court concluded that the State had failed to establish that such
requirements furthered a compelling state interest, either in protect-
ing abortion patients from psychological and emotional distress, or
in preventing women from being coerced into having abortions.
As of January 2012, “[twenty-one] states have laws that pro-
hibit some or all state employees, or organizations that receive state
funds, from providing, counseling, or referring women for abortion
services.” 386 Further, “[s]everal federal laws constitute back-door [sic]
gag rules by allowing health-care employees and companies to refuse
380. See Casey, 550 U.S. at 884.
381. See Robertson, supra note 316, at 355 (quoting Tex. Medical Providers Performing
Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, No. A-l l-CA-486-SS, at *42 (W.D.Tex. Aug. 31, 2011)).
382. Tex. Medical Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 575 (5th
Cir. 2012) (quoting Casey, 550 U.S. at 882).
383. Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424 (M.D.N.C. 2011).
384. Id. at 431.
385. See id. at 431–32 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992)).
386. See NARAL, supra note 327, at 13.
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to provide, pay for, counsel for, or even refer [women] for abortion
services.” 387 The most restrictive federal law was implemented in
2009 through a Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
regulation enacted in the final days of the Bush administration.388
The regulation,389 known as the Federal Refusal Rule, expanded the
ability of healthcare providers to refuse to provide, cover, or refer
women for medical services.390 In February 2011, the Obama admin-
istration rescinded the key elements of the HHS regulation.391
Currently, twenty-four states prohibit insurance plans for public
employees or private-sector individuals, or both, from covering abor-
tion services.392 Of these twenty-four states, three states prohibit abor-
tion coverage in the entire private insurance market.393 Rhode Island
has two separate insurance prohibition laws.394 The First Circuit
found the first law to be unconstitutional and unenforceable, and the
second law to be partially unconstitutional and unenforceable.395 In
Kansas, the district court set down the question of whether a similar
insurance prohibition statute396 places an undue burden on a woman
seeking an abortion.397
Forty-seven states, and the District of Columbia, have laws that
include provisions known as “refusals,” which permit a broad
range of individuals and institutions—including hospitals, hospi-
tal employees, health-care providers, pharmacists, employers, and
387. Id. (“The key laws include the Church amendment (1973, 1974), the Coats amend-
ment to the Public Health Service Act (1996), and the Federal Refusal Clause (also known
as the Weldon amendment, 2004).”)
388. H.R. 3293, 111th Cong. (2009).
389. Regulation for the Enforcement of Federal Health Care Provider Conscience
Protection Laws, 76 C.F.R. § 9968-02 (2011).
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. See NARAL, supra note 327, at 14–15.
393. Id. at 15.
394. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 27-18-28 (West 1956); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 36-12-2.1
(West 1956).
395. National Educ. Ass’n of Rhode Island v. Garrahy, 779 F.2d 790, 790 (1st Cir. 1986),
affg. 598 F. Supp. 1374 (D. R.I. 1984); see also Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
v. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d 283, 293 (3d Cir. 1984) (demonstrating insurance restriction adds
a barrier to obtaining abortion; state’s asserted interest in lowering insurance costs im-
pinges on a fundamental right and cannot withstand strict scrutiny). The Eighth Circuit
found summary judgment should not have been granted to a plaintiff who “introduced no
evidence that insurance policies covering elective abortions are unavailable or prohibitively
expensive” as a result of the law, and where the state claimed the law rationally furthered
a legitimate governmental purpose of “reducing the cost of insurance and in protecting the
interests of citizens who object to subsidizing abortions through payment of their insurance
premiums.” Coe v. Melahn, 958 F.2d 223, 225–26 (8th Cir. 1992).
396. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2,190 (West 2011).
397. ACLU v. Praeger, 917 F. Supp. 2d 1204, 1221 (D. Kan. 2013).
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insurance companies—to refuse to provide, pay for, counsel for,
or even refer patients for medical treatment that they oppose.398
In Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Am. Ass’n of Pro-Life Obste-
tricians & Gynecologists,399 the Arizona Court of Appeals held that a
challenge to such a law could not succeed because reproductive rights
could only be asserted against governmental acts, not the decisions
of private individuals.400
All women should have access to reproductive health care, regard-
less of their economic status; however, discriminatory restrictions on
public funding make abortion services an unavailable choice for many
low-income women. Banning public funding for certain services limits
reproductive health options for those who rely on the government for
their healthcare. These policies put women’s health in danger, and
allow politicians to interfere with the doctor-patient relationship.401
Currently, thirty-three states, and the District of Columbia, re-
strict access to abortion for low income women, while seventeen states
“fund abortion services for low-income women in extremely limited
circumstances beyond federal restrictions.” 402
Several federal laws, most notably the Hyde amendment,403 bar
access to abortion care for most low-income women who rely on the
federal government for their health care, with exceptions only to
preserve the woman’s life or if the pregnancy results from rape or
incest.404 Women affected by these bans include recipients of Med-
icaid, Medicare, the State Children’s Health Insurance Program,
and Indian Health Service clients.405
398. NARAL, supra note 327, at 16; see also supra notes 386–91 and accompanying text.
399. Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc., v. Am. Ass’n of Pro-Life Obstetricians & Gynecol-
ogists, 257 P.3d 181, 196 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011).
400. Id.
401. NARAL, supra note 327, at 13.
402. Id. at 17 (specifying AK, AZ, CA, CT, HI, IL, MD, MA, MN, MT, NJ, NM, NY, OR,
VT, WA, WV).
403. Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-112, §§ 502-03.
The Hyde Amendment is a rider to the annual Labor/Health and Human
Services (HHS)/Education appropriations bill which prevents Medicaid and
any other programs under these departments from funding abortions, except
in limited cases. It is named after Rep. Henry J. Hyde (R-IL) who, as a fresh-
man legislator, first offered the amendment.
The Hyde Amendment, NAT’L COMM. FOR A HUMAN LIFE AMENDMENT 1 (Apr. 2008), http://
www.nchla.org/datasource/ifactsheets/4FSHydeAm22a.08.pdf.
404. The constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment was upheld in Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980).
405. NARAL, supra note 327, at 17. “ ‘Because of the Hyde Amendment, more than a mil-
lion women have been denied the ability to make their own decisions about bringing a child
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The Affordable Care Act[’s] . . . [a]bortion coverage restric-
tions in the law, known as the Nelson provisions . . . , require plans
participating in health insurance exchanges to segregate monies
used for abortion services from all other funds and also require
those purchasing a plan with abortion coverage to make separate
premium payments. These restrictions compel both individuals
and insurance companies to incur increased administrative bur-
dens and could jeopardize insurers’ willingness to offer full repro-
ductive health coverage, affecting low- and middle-income women’s
access to care.406
At least “forty-four states have parental-notice or -consent laws
that restrict young women’s access to abortion.” 407 For a parental
consent statute to be constitutional it must contain a bypass pro-
vision that meets four criteria: (i) allows the minor to bypass the
consent requirement if she establishes that she is mature enough,
and well enough informed to make the abortion decision independ-
ently; (ii) allows the minor to bypass the consent requirement if she
establishes that the abortion would be in her best interest; (iii) en-
sures the minor’s anonymity; and (iv) provides for expeditious by-
pass procedures.408
Although these criteria may sound adequate in the abstract, in
practice, they are illusory. In re Doe409 is illustrative. Doe involved
a minor who had applied for judicial authorization for an abortion.410
During a confidential hearing, the minor indicated that she was a
high school senior who intended to attend college, and that she was
aware of the procedure, risks, and alternatives in making the deci-
sion to have the abortion.411 Further, she indicated that she had not
into the world in the context of their own circumstances and those of their families.’ ”
Stephanie Poggi, Executive Director of the National Network of Abortion Funds, quoted
in Whose Choice? How the Hyde Amendment Harms Poor Women 4, CTR. FOR REPROD.
RIGHTS (Sept. 2010), available at http://reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net
/files/documents/Hyde_Report_FINAL_nospreads.pdf.
406. NARAL, supra note 327, at 17; see also Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
11 Pub. L. No. 148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
407. NARAL, supra note 327, at 19.
408. Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 295 (1997) (upholding parental notification re-
quirement); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 412–13 (1981) (upholding parental notification
requirement). For thoughtful discussions about judicial interpretation and issues specific
to parental notification and consent statutes, see generally J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, Journey
Through the Courts: Minors, Abortion, and the Quest for Reproductive Fairness, 10 YALE
L.J. & FEMINISM 1 (1998); Jennifer C. Friedman, Parental Notice in State Abortion Statutes:
Filling the Gap in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 437 (1998);
Catherine Grevers Schmidt, Where Privacy Fails: Equal Protection and the Abortion Rights
of Minors, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 597 (1993).
409. In re Doe, 33 A.3d 615, 615 (Pa. 2011).
410. Id. at 618.
411. Id.
164 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW               [Vol. 20:123
sought her mother’s consent because she feared being thrown out of
the house.412
The trial court denied the request, finding, among other things,
that the minor’s failure to seek parental consent indicated that she
was not “mature and capable” of giving informed consent independ-
ently.413 The intermediate appellate court affirmed the decision, find-
ing that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.414 In reviewing the
decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, applied an abuse of dis-
cretion standard, rather than a more stringent one recommended by
the ACLU.415 Nonetheless, it concluded that the trial court had abused
its discretion, because it lacked statutory authority to deny the minor’s
petition for judicial authorization based on her failure to obtain pa-
rental consent.416
In re Doe should be contrasted with the recent decision of the
Nebraska Supreme Court, which reached the opposite conclusion.
In re Anonymous417 involved a sixteen year old, who was ten weeks
pregnant. The trial court denied the application upon a finding that
she was “not sufficiently mature to decide whether to have an abor-
tion” after telling her “ ‘when you have the abortion it’s going to kill
the child inside you.’ ” 418 A majority of the Supreme Court upheld the
finding, despite the dissent’s observation that
[t]he petitioner has no legal parents; the juvenile court termi-
nated their parental rights. Her legal guardian, the Department
[of Health and Human Services]—by regulation—will not give her
consent. And although the district court has required her to get
her foster parents’ consent to obtain an abortion, their consent
would be meaningless under the law because they are neither
parents nor guardians. She is in a legal limbo—a quandary of the
Legislature’s making.419
Decisions such as Anonymous and In re Doe show that the judi-
cial bypass mechanism often depends upon the personal viewpoint
of the judge hearing the application.420 Although some young women
will consult with a parent, many feel that they cannot tell a parent
about the pregnancy for various reasons, including abuse, rape, or
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. Id. at 621.
415. In re Doe, 33 A.3d 615, 624 (Pa. 2011).
416. Id. at 628.
417. In re Anonymous 5, 286 Neb. 640 (2013).
418. Id. at 643, 644.
419. Id. at 654.
420. Helena Silverstein & Leanne Speitel, “Honey I Have No Idea”: Court Readiness to
Handle Petitions to Waive Parental Consent for Abortion, 88 IOWA L. REV. 75, 77 (2002).
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incest.421 Forcing a young woman to tell an abusive parent about her
decision to terminate a pregnancy could also lead to family violence.422
Furthermore, placing restrictions on a young woman’s access to abor-
tion can delay her from seeking earlier, safer care, thus putting her
health at risk.423
The recent imposition of unnecessary and burdensome regula-
tions targeting abortion providers over other medical professionals is
an obvious attempt to increase costs, prevent ease of access to abortion
care, and drive these physicians out of practice.424
Such proposals are known as TRAP laws: Targeted Regulation of
Abortion Providers. Common TRAP regulations include those that
restrict where abortion care may be provided. Regulations limiting
abortion care to hospitals or other specialized facilities, rather than
physicians’ offices, require doctors to obtain medically unnecessary
additional licenses, needlessly convert their practices into mini-
hospitals at a great expense, or provide abortion services only at
hospitals, an impossibility in many parts of the country.425
Forty-five states have enacted such laws.426 The American College
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), however, has explicitly
stated on more than one occasion that admitting privileges are not
necessary to the provision of safe abortions, and publicly opposes laws
that make abortion access contingent on the availability of such
privileges.427 Instead of admitting privileges, ACOG and other health
organizations emphasize the need for clearly established policies and
protocols to govern the transfer of patients needing emergency care
to a hospital.428
421. Council on Judicial and Ethical Affairs, Mandatory Parental Consent to Abortion, 2–
4 (1993), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/code-medical-ethics/2015a.pdf.
422. Id.
423. Silverstein & Speitel, supra note 420, at 111–12.
424. Lisa M. Brown, The TRAP: Targeted Regulations of Abortion Providers, NAT’L
ABORTION FED’N, http://www.prochoice.org/about_abortion/facts/trap_laws.html.
425. NARAL, supra note 327, at 20.
426. Id.
427. See Statement on State Legislation Requiring Hospital Admitting Privileges for
Physicians Providing Abortion Services, ACOG (Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.acog.org
/About%20ACOG/News%20Room/News%20Releases/2013/Hospital%20Admitting
%20Privileges%20for%20Physicians%20Providing%20Abortion%20Services.aspx; Ralph
Hale, Analysis of the Possible FDA Mifepristone Restrictions, AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS
AND GYNECOLOGISTS 3 (July 27, 2000), available at http://www.aaplog.org/wp-content
/uploads/2002/05/ACOGAnalysisMifepristone7-27-00.pdf (“Privileges at a hospital are not
necessary for prescribing [medication abortion] safely . . . . The prescribing physician does
not need to be in the emergency room or to be the admitting physician if a patient requires
follow-up emergency care. Women experiencing miscarriages and spontaneous abortions
frequently require the same services and care and appropriately receive this care at their
physicians’ offices.”).
428. AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, GUIDELINES FOR WOMEN’S HEALTH
CARE: A RESOURCE MANUAL 433 (Paula Hillard et al., eds., 3d ed. 2007) (“Clinicians who
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In fact, the admitting privileges requirement is irrelevant to the
optimal provision of care to abortion patients.429 In the exceedingly
rare event that hospitalization is required, the physician who provided
the abortion may not be the appropriate physician to manage the pa-
tient’s care in the hospital.430 For example, if the patient has suffered
a vascular or bowel injury, it is critical that she be treated by the ap-
propriate subspecialist; similarly, a woman with a cardiac or lung re-
lated complication should be seen by a cardiologist or pulmonologist.431
Moreover, the admitting privileges requirement is only applied
to abortion clinics, while physicians frequently perform surgeries that
are far more complicated and riskier than abortions in ambulatory
surgical centers.432 In the field of gynecology, this can include laparos-
copy, laparoscopic hysterectomy, and vaginal hysterectomy.433 These
procedures also generally involve general anesthesia, requiring the
patient to be paralyzed and intubated, which is not normally used
in an abortion procedure.434 The use of general anesthesia in itself
is riskier than an abortion.435
Federal courts have not hesitated to strike down laws that use
admitting privileges, or similar measures, to delegate arbitrary and
unreviewable authority, with no standards, over abortion providers
to private hospitals.436 In Birth Control Centers, Inc. v. Reizen,437 a fed-
eral district court in Michigan held that a law that required abortion
clinics to secure either a written transfer agreement with a hospital
perform abortions in their offices, clinics, or freestanding ambulatory care facilities should
have a plan to provide prompt emergency services if a complication occurs and should es-
tablish a mechanism for transferring patients who require emergency treatment.”); 2013
Clinical Policy Guidelines, NAT’L ABORTION FED’N, at i, 55 (2012), available at http://www
.prochoice.org/pubs_research/publications/documents/2013NAFCPGsforweb.pdf (“Protocols
for the management of medical emergencies must be in place. These protocols must include
indications for emergency transport and written, readily available directions for contacting
external emergency assistance (i.e., an ambulance).”).
429. Imani Gandy, Why Admitting Privileges Laws Have No Medical Benefit, RH
REALITY CHECK (July 24, 2013, 3:30 PM), http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2013/07/24
/why-admitting-privileges-laws-have-no-medical-benefit/.
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. Elizabeth Flock, Docs: Texas Abortion Bill Doesn’t Make Sense, U.S. NEWS AND
WORLD REPORT (June 27, 2013), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/06/26/obgyn
-docs-say-provisions-in-filibustered-texas-abortion-bill-dont-make-sense.
433. See Bulent Berker et al., Complications of Laparoscopic Gynecologic Surgery,
SOCIETY OF LAPAROENDOSCOPIC SURGEONS, http://laparoscopy.blogs.com/prevention
_management_3/2010/07/complications-of-laparoscopic-gynecologic-surgery.html.
434. Crimando Laurie, Total Laparoscopic Hysterectomy, UNIV. OF MICHIGAN: VON
VOIGTLANDER WOMEN’S HOSP. 3–4 (2011), http://www.med.umich.edu/11libr/gyn/TLH.pdf.
435. See Flock, supra note 432.
436. Birth Control Ctrs. v. Reizen, 508 F. Supp. 1366, 1374 (E.D. Mich. 1981), aff’d on
other grounds, 743 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1984).
437. Id.
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or a written agreement with a physician with staff privileges at a
local hospital “violate[d] due process concepts because [it] delegate[d]
a licensing function to private entities without standards to guide
their discretion.” 438
As the court explained,
The defect lies in the delegation of unguided power to a private
entity, whose self-interest could color its decision to assist licensure
of a competitor. Similar delegations of licensing functions have met
with judicial disapproval. . . . The power to prohibit licensure may
not constitutionally be placed in the hands of hospitals. Such an
impermissible delegation without standards or safeguards to pro-
tect against unfairness, arbitrariness or favoritism is void for lack
of due process.439
Similarly, in Hallmark Clinic v. North Carolina Department of
Human Resources,440 the court ruled unconstitutional a law requiring
abortion clinics either to have a written transfer agreement with local
hospitals, or to ensure that all its physicians have full admitting privi-
leges at a local hospital.441 The court held the state had given “hospi-
tals the arbitrary power to veto the performance of abortions for any
reason or no reason at all.” 442 Similarly, the court recognized that
“[s]taff privileges, like transfer agreements, depend on the whim or
good will of a hospital . . . and the Department ha[d] not undertaken
to superimpose its own criteria or even guidelines to control admis-
sion to staff privileges.” 443
As the court concluded,
the state cannot confer upon a private institution the exercise of
arbitrary and capricious power. If the state is determined to utilize
hospitals as a control factor for the protection of patients in free-
standing abortion clinics then it must establish and enforce stan-
dards for admission to hospital staff privileges. To do otherwise
438. Id.
439. Id. at 1375 (internal citations omitted).
440. Hallmark Clinic v. North Carolina Dep’t of Human Res., 380 F. Supp. 1153, 1159
(E.D.N.C. 1974).
441. Id. at 1153–54.
442. Id. at 1158.
443. Id. at 1159; Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 610 (6th Cir. 2006)
(holding the nondelegation doctrine inapplicable where the state had ability to waive
hospital transfer agreement requirement thus “prevent[ing] the hospitals from having
an unconstitutional third-party veto over [abortion clinic’s] license”). Indeed, the lack of
any supervisory or waiver power over the process distinguishes an admitting privileges
requirement from other such requirements that have been upheld by the federal courts.
See Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 610 (6th Cir. 2006); Greenville
Women’s Clinic v. Comm’r, S.C. Dep’t of Health & Env’t. Control, 317 F.3d 357, 362–63
(4th Cir. 2002).
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is government by caprice and cannot withstand fourteenth amend-
ment challenges.444
A notable exception recently occurred in the Fifth Circuit. In
Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott
a motions panel of that Court granted a stay of a judgment enjoin-
ing enforcement of a Texas statute that required abortion providers
to have hospital admitting privileges.445 The panel concluded that “the
State has made a strong showing that it is likely to prevail on the
merits.” 446 In doing so, the panel relied upon the Eighth Circuit’s de-
cision in Women’s Health Center of West County, Inc. v. Webster.447 But
that case is inapposite. As the Eighth Circuit pointed out, the stat-
ute at issue was not an attempt to regulate the licensing of abortion
clinics, but rather to regulate the qualifications of physicians who per-
form abortions.448 The Texas statute on the other hand was directly
related to the regulation of abortion clinics.449
TRAP legislation has, at its core, the aim of reducing the avail-
ability of abortion services and with no real health justification.450
Accordingly, such legislation has not withstood constitutional attack.451
Legislation “that has the effect of forcing all or a substantial portion
of a state’s abortion providers to stop offering such procedures cre-
ates a substantial obstacle to a woman’s right to have a pre-viability
abortion, thus constituting an undue burden under Casey.” 452
Despite these clear authorities, state legislatures have not
stopped trying to impose these restrictive regulations.453 On June 14,
2013, the Wisconsin Legislature passed Section 1 of 2013 Wisconsin
Act 37, which, among other things, requires physicians providing abor-
tion services in Wisconsin to have admitting privileges at a hospital
444. Id.; cf. Women’s Med. Ctr. of Nw. Houston v. Bell, 248 F.3d 411, 422 (5th Cir. 2001).
445. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 2013 U.S.
App. LEXIS 22231 (5th Cir. Oct. 31, 2013). Planned Parenthood made an application to
the Circuit Justice to vacate the stay granted by the Fifth Circuit. Planned Parenthood
of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154069 (W.D.
Tex. Oct. 28, 2013). The Supreme Court declined to vacate the stay by a 5–4 vote. Planned
Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 8415 (U.S.
Nov. 19, 2013).
446. Id. at *3.
447. Women’s Health Ctr. v. Webster, 871 F.2d 1377 (8th Cir. 1989).
448. Id. at 1382.
449. Abbott, 2013 U.S. App. at *1.
450. See supra note 425 and accompanying text.
451. NARAL, supra note 327, at 20.
452. Okpalobi v. Foster, 190 F.3d 337, 357 (5th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted), superseded
on reh’g en banc on other grounds, 244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001); accord Tucson Woman’s
Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 541 (9th Cir. 2004) (“A significant increase in the cost of abor-
tion or [decrease in] the supply of abortion providers and clinics can, at some point, consti-
tute a substantial obstacle to a significant number of women choosing an abortion.”).
453. NARAL, supra note 327, at 2.
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within thirty miles of their clinic.454 Finding that the impact of this
legislation would be the closure of a vast majority of clinics in the
state, the court in Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin v. Van Hollen,455
granted a preliminary injunction against its enforcement.456
State Legislatures have also sought to ban mifepristone (RU486).
The Court was referring to ingestion of mifepristone (RU486), com-
monly known as the abortion pill, which can only be used in the early
weeks of pregnancy.457 Oklahoma passed such a law in 2011 that ren-
dered the abortion pill unavailable to a majority of women.458 Thirteen
additional states have also passed laws in recent years that restrict
the availability of medical abortions.459
Since the FDA approved the drug in 2000, the number of early
abortions has increased to 90% of abortions performed in the first
twelve weeks.460
The abortion pill debate raises several interesting constitutional
questions. For instance, courts face the problem of whether the abor-
tion pill should be classified as contraception or an abortifacient.461
Although Mifepristone is approved by the FDA, the drug is used in
conjunction with another drug, misoprostol, which is not approved, to
terminate pregnancy.462 As a result, the Oklahoma law has effectively
banned the abortion pill by banning the off-label use of misoprostol.463
The act harms women in two ways: (1) “the Act removes a safe,
non-invasive treatment option for women seeking termination of ec-
topic pregnancies, which are health- and life-threatening pregnancies
occurring outside the uterus in approximately two percent of preg-
nancies,” and, (2) “the Act will prevent women seeking termination
of intrauterine pregnancies from accessing safe, effective and non-
invasive treatment options.” 464
The Supreme Court initially granted certiorari to consider the
issue, but held all proceedings in abeyance pending a response to
454. 2013–2014 Wis. Legislative Serv. Act 37 (2013 S.B. 206) (West).
455. Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin v. Van Hollen, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110097
(W.D. Wis. Aug. 2, 2013).
456. Van Hollen, 2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis 110097, at *70.
457. See Robertson, supra note 316, at 339.
458. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-729a (2010).
459. See State Policies in Brief: Medication Abortion, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE 2 (Nov. 1,
2013), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_MA.pdf.
460. See id. (citing JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 63–66 (1994)).
461. Samantha Harper, Note, “The Morning After”: How Far Can States Go to Restrict
Access to Emergency Contraception?, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 221, 243 (2006).
462. Id.
463. OKLA. STAT. tit 63, § 1-729a (2010).
464. Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, with Support-
ing Brief, at 3, Okla. Coal. for Reprod. Justice v. Cline, 2011 WL 7463407 (D. Okla. 2011).
170 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW               [Vol. 20:123
questions that it certified to the Oklahoma Supreme Court.465 The
Oklahoma Supreme Court answered those questions and held that
the law that it had struck “prohibits the use of misoprostol to induce
abortions, including the use of misoprostol in conjunction with mi-
fepristone according to a protocol approved by the Food and Drug
Administration and prohibits the use of methotrexate to treat ec-
topic pregnancies.” 466 The Supreme Court then dismissed the writ
of certiorari as improvidently granted.467
It has been noted
that had the justices been certain from the start that the
Oklahoma law banned drug-induced abortions, they would have
denied the state’s appeal at the outset. . . . [T]he decision sug-
gests that the court is unwilling to revisit what it called the ‘core
holding’ of Roe v. Wade, which found a constitutional right to
abortion procedures.468
Decisions involving abortion restrictions should follow history,
logic, and basic personal rights of women and reaffirm that the deter-
mination to have an abortion is a personal choice, between a woman
and her doctor. This decision should be free of roadblocks designed,
not to protect the life of the patient, but rather to support the reli-
gious and moral views of individuals who have no nexus with the cir-
cumstance facing the woman and patient.469 No woman is compelled
to undergo abortion, and those whose personal and religious princi-
ples forbid abortion are in no way compelled to do anything against
their conviction.470
CONCLUSION
“The more things change, the more they stay the same.” 471 So
said novelist and journalist Jean-Baptiste Alphonse Karr (albeit in
465. Cline v. Okla. Coal. for Reprod. Justice, 133 S.Ct. 2887 (2013). The certified ques-
tions were “[w]hether H.B. No. 1970, Section 1, Chapter 216, O.S.L. 2011 prohibits: (1) the
use of misoprostol to induce abortions, including the use of misoprostol in conjunction with
mifepristone according to a protocol approved by the Food and Drug Administration; and
(2) the use of methotrexate to treat ectopic pregnancies.”
466. Cline v. Okla. Coal. for Reprod. Justice, 2013 OK 93, 2013 Okla Lexis 124, at
*31 (2013).
467. Cline v. Okla. Coal. for Reprod. Justice, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 7855 (2013).
468.  Jess Bravin, Supreme Court Snubs Oklahoma Abortion Case, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5,
2013, at A6.
469. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848–50 (1992).
470. See, e.g., Regulation for the Enforcement of Federal Health Care Provider Con-
science Protection Laws, supra note 389.
471. GREGORY Y. TITELMAN, RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF POPULAR PROVERBS AND
SAYINGS (Random House, New York, 1996).
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French), highlighting, of course, that as tumultuous as times are,
nothing really changes. He certainly wasn’t talking about abor-
tion, but he could have been. The arguments made to undermine a
woman’s reproductive freedom are not new. As the testimony before
the Governor’s Commission demonstrates, witnesses argued fetal
pain, life at conception, and morals. They were convincingly refuted
at that time and in the Roe opinion. Thus, as Professor Means so
well put it,
. . . [O]ver the long pull, the Roe v. Wade opinion
will outlast its critics. . . . [T]he work of the Court,
like the Constitution it interprets, is not designed
for seasons, silly or otherwise, but for the ages.472
472. Hearings, supra note 6, at 36.
